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Growth and development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are the key 
drivers of economic growth and development in Africa. While this has become a widely 
accepted idea, access to financing for growth remains a stumbling block for many 
enterprises in Zambia. Traditional lenders (i.e. banks) are risk averse because they may not 
understand the SME market and have been negatively impacted by information asymmetry 
that is often associated with these ventures. As a result, they tend to charge exorbitant 
interest rates that are unsustainable for long-term growth. The existing focus of many 
microfinance institutions in Zambia is typically directed towards salaried employees which 
crowds out lending to SMEs. Private equity financing, on the other hand, presents an 
alternative solution to the long-term financing dilemma faced by enterprises. The Zambian 
private equity market is itself in a nascent space but shows much potential. This dissertation 
seeks to determine what drives private equity financing in Zambia and what constrains it. 
The dissertation adopts a qualitative research approach relying on the interviews of various 
Fund Managers who are familiar with investing in Zambia. The paper finds that private 
equity investment in Zambia is determined and catalysed broadly by business attractiveness 
and the business environment. Business attractiveness is underpinned by management 
capacity, the business track record, exits and returns, impact potential and business 
scalability. The business environment is driven by political stability, GDP growth and 
population growth. The sector is however, constrained by a less developed private equity 
culture, limited opportunities to invest and currency risk. 
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1.1 Background of study 
 
Strong businesses are the backbone of any economy. They provide much needed 
products and services to consumers, employment and income to employees, create 
value for shareholders, and generate valuable fiscal revenue for the government. 
Besides the obvious monetary and product offerings associated with businesses, they 
also foster innovation and creativity – bringing new ideas and inventions to the fore that 
are long-term game changers. The complete evolution of the music industry away from 
compact disks to electronic devices and interfaces (for example the iPod and iTunes 
provided by Apple Inc.), is an example of a revolutionary business idea that disrupted 
and transformed an entire industry. 
 
It is clear that the development of businesses in any country is critical for meaningful 
growth and development. Africa’s catalogue of development problems is vast and well 
documented. Part of the solution to the economic challenges that the continent has faced 
and continues to face has been the generally accepted idea that the promotion of 
enterprises can propel the continent forward and alleviate its financial and economic 
woes. 
 
There are different interpretations across various countries of what constitutes small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs). Total employees, net assets, revenue and investment 
levels are popular measures used to define SMEs with the most popular measure being 
employee numbers. Generally, SMEs are defined as employing between 0 and 250 staff 
(Ayyagari, Beck, & Demirgüç-Kunt, 2007). They can be disaggregated further as 
follows: micro-enterprises that employ 1-9 people, small firms that employ 10-50 
people and medium firms that employ 50-250 people (Sveinung, Leo, & Chris, 2010). 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, typically 90% of SMEs are micro enterprises and these are often 
not a part of the formal economy (Sveinung et al., 2010). This publication is more 
concerned with formal enterprises. 
 
SMEs contribute to economic and social development. Generally, they create 
employment, improve competition, establish new industries, grow existing industries 
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and positively impact the economy. SMEs also drive rural development and trade 
between regions (Shinozaki, 2012).  
 
Because SMEs constitute a large part of a country’s work force, employment creation, 
especially in rural areas is an important aspect of their contribution towards 
development, especially in Africa. According to Katyal & Xaviour (2015), SMEs are 
able to provide employment at a cost of capital that is lower than larger industries and 
help rural areas industrialise. This helps with improvements in the equitable sharing of 
income and wealth as well as with correcting imbalances between regions. Tambunan's 
(2008) study of Indonesia showed that SMEs accounted for 90% of total employment 
and produced basic consumer goods for the national market. They also contributed 
more than 50% of the country’s GDP between 2001 and 2006 and performed better 
than larger enterprises. The average GDP growth shares of Indonesian SMEs stood at 
over 2% compared against larger enterprises whose GDP growth share was below 2%. 
 
SMEs improve competition, innovation, and productivity. SMEs can create value 
chains with mutually beneficial sales and production processes through clustering 
together. Clusters are able to catalyse competition, encourage the development of start-
up enterprises, boost product quality and increase production efficiency. Clusters also 
make it easier to access financial services, trade partners, raw material suppliers and 
skilled employees. According to one study, export-focussed SME clusters helped some 
Asian countries weather the effects of the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis (Shinozaki, 
2012). Larger enterprises are also able to subcontract certain processes or product needs 
to SMEs in a bid to become more efficient, presenting an opportunity for the SME to 
grow with the large enterprise (Sveinung et al., 2010; Tambunan, 2008).  
 
Flexible specialism is a theory that emerged in the 1980s after the re-birth of craft-based 
SMEs in Western Europe. Flexible specialism is characterised by the usage of 
technology, high-skilled and multi-skilled employees, and the small-scale production 
of specific products for global markets. Through flexible specialism, Western nations 
like the USA and Sweden as well as other nations like Japan, have seen their electronics 
and automotive subsectors generate innovative and efficient products. With flexible 
specialism, SMEs are able to grow just as fast if not faster than larger enterprises and 




Figure 1: The role of SMEs in economic growth 
 
Source: Sveinung et al. (2010, p.14) 
 
In their assessment of Sub-Saharan African (SSA) economies, Sveinung et al. (2010) 
note that SMEs begin to impact economic growth when income levels rise. They 
observe that SMEs become more important to a country’s economic development when 
a country has persistent levels of economic growth and is focussed on development. 
This relationship is presented in Figure 1 above. With the growth of developing 
economies, the services sector also expands due to increased demand for transportation, 
personal and business services and utilities to name a few. Further, a growing economy 
incentivises firms to go beyond informal structures and practices. In SSA, growth has 
mainly been predicated on minor business environment improvements and increases in 
foreign investment. However, within the context of globalisation, for an economy to 
grow, businesses need to specialise. They should be able to produce efficiently to make 
their products competitive both domestically and internationally. This explains why 
Asia has developed a reputation for low and medium cost technological and industrial 
production (Sveinung et al., 2010). This should be the bigger picture objective for 
SMEs.  
 
Zambia’s story is no different from the typical African country. According to the latest 
available World Bank data, 54.4% of the Zambian population is considered poor and 
40.8% is considered as extremely poor. More than three-quarters of the poorest in 
Zambia live in rural areas (World Bank, 2016, p.1). Business innovation and success 
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represents a critical lifeline for the country. SMEs all require financing to help them 
grow and transform into stable, viable corporations (Abor, 2017) but access to finance, 
especially long-term finance, is a commonly faced growth constraint by most Zambian 
entrepreneurs and business houses (World Bank & IFC, 2013). 
 
The Zambian private sector can be divided between micro, small and medium 
enterprises (MSMEs) which employ 88% of workforce and large corporate enterprises 
which employ 7% of the workforce but generate most of Zambia’s economic output 
(Clarke, Shah, Sheppard, Munro, & Pearson, 2010). It is estimated that as at 2010, there 
were 1.05 million MSMEs of which only 29,350 were considered formal MSMEs as 
per Zambia Revenue Authority data (Shah, 2012). 
 
As earlier alluded to, SME definitions are varied across different countries. The 
Zambian government defines them across the following variables: total fixed 
investment, total revenue, total number of employees and legal status. Micro enterprises 
invest up to K80,000 ($8,000), have annual revenue of up to K150,000 ($15,000) and 
employ up to 10 people. Small enterprises invest between K80,000 and K200,000 
($8,000 to $20,000), have annual revenue of between K150,000 and K300,000 
($15,000 to $30,000) and employ between 11 and 50 people. Medium enterprises invest 
between K151,000 and K500,000 ($15,100 to $50,000), have annual revenue of 
between K300,000 and K800,000 ($30,000 to $80,000) and between 51 and 100 people 
(Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry, 2008). 
 
The latest available detailed Zambian private sector survey conducted in 2010 defines 
enterprises differently. Large enterprises employ over 50 people and are a few thousand 
in number. 50% of large enterprises employ between 51 and 70 people, 33% employ 
over 100 employees and just 2.5% employ over 500 people. Three quarters of large 
businesses are incorporated as limited liability companies and large businesses in 
general are primarily engaged in manufacturing (24%), agriculture (14%) and 
wholesale and retail trade (9%). The formal private sector only employs 7% of the 
labour force despite 200 of the largest companies accounting for the majority of 
industrial output. Although mining generates 70% of Zambia’s exports, it only employs 




Zambia has a large informal private sector that, as at 2010, employed 88% of the 
workforce despite not contributing to the country’s GDP as significantly as the larger 
companies. The SMEs are mostly informal, owner-operated, have 5 or less employees 
and are mostly found in rural Zambia (81%). They engage primarily in agriculture 
followed by wholesale and retail trade. These SMEs can be broken down into tiny, 
owner-operated businesses referred to as “survivalists” (77%), high-potential 
enterprises that are not adequately serviced (13%) and urbanised businesses led by the 
well-educated (16%). The last two segments represent the two groups of SMEs that 
have the most potential for growth (Clarke et al., 2010). 
 
Zambian firms, specifically manufacturing firms, face the challenge of not being as 
productive as their peers in countries like South Africa and Kenya and in major export 
nations like China. Low levels of productivity combined with high unit labour costs 
make Zambian enterprises less competitive. Low levels of competition in the Zambian 
market mean that large organisations are likely to command a significant market share 
and possess a monopoly over prices. If market share was based purely on productivity, 
some Zambian businesses’ market shares would be eroded. Because of low domestic 
competition, large firms are able to offset the costs of low productivity levels with 
higher prices. These higher prices coupled with low levels of competition create a high-
cost economy. Competition is hampered by the high cost of financing, volatile 
exchange rates due to dependence on mining, tax policies that place a 
disproportionately higher burden on smaller enterprises, corruption and infrastructure 
weaknesses especially in the areas of electricity and transportation (Clarke et al., 2010). 
 
Access to finance remains a challenge for Zambian firms, specifically SMEs. 27% of 
enterprises surveyed in the most recent World Bank Enterprise Survey indicated that 
obtaining a loan was a constraint to their operations (World Bank, 2013). Private equity 
(PE) financing presents an alternative source of long-term capital for both new and 
established SMEs with high-growth potential. The PE industry in Zambia is fairly 
nascent and from an academic perspective, it has not been an area of research focus. 
Therefore, the overall objective of this paper is to shed some light on the sector and in 
doing so, increase awareness amongst business owners and policy makers alike. It is 
envisioned that Zambian SMEs that fall into the PE “sweet spot” will come to 
appreciate and understand what these financiers are looking for in a potential investee. 
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It is also hoped that policy holders will understand what matters to equity financiers 
from a business environment perspective. Finally, it is expected that recommendations 
that encourage the growth of PE financing as a means of financing businesses for the 
country’s long-term economic growth and development will also be presented. 
 
1.2 Problem statement 
The most recent and comprehensive access to finance survey of Zambian enterprises 
was conducted by the World Bank in 2013 and is presented in Table 1. Generally 
speaking, Zambian firms lag behind the average SSA firm. On average on 9% of firms 
had access to a bank loan or line of credit compared against a SSA average of 21%. 
34% of Zambian enterprises’ loan applications had recently been rejected at the time of 
the survey. In the small enterprise tier, the loan rejection rate stood at 53%. It is not 
difficult then, to understand why 27% of the firms surveyed considered access to 
financing as a serious impediment to their growth.  
 
Nominal interest rates can get as high as 40% amongst commercial banks and up to 
70% amongst microfinance institutions (Ministry of Finance, 2017a). In addition to 
this, Zambian lenders have higher collateral lending requirements than the average SSA 
lender (see Table 1). 91% of loans required collateral and the value of the collateral 
required was 237% the value of the loan (World Bank, 2013). Zambian lenders tend to 
prefer to secure debt on immovable property like land and buildings because the 
Ministry of Lands is considered to be a trustworthy asset registry source (Mseteka, 
2018). To address this challenge, the Zambian legislature enacted the Movable Property 
Act in 2016, which allows security interests to be created on movable property. They 
also established a Collateral Office and Collateral Registry (Ministry of Finance, 
2017a). However, as at 2018, only 2 banks are reported two have started accepting 
movable assets as collateral (Manda, 2018). The reality is that many Zambian SMEs do 
not possess immovable property.  
 
By their inherent nature, small enterprises like sole-traders are unlikely to have a credit 
history or the means to acquire immovable property (Beck & Cull, 2014). High 
collateral requirements and high interest rates, coupled with poor lending tools and-  
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Table 1: Access to finance for Zambian firms 
 
Source: World Bank (2013)1 
Definitions: Small enterprise = 5 to 19 employees, medium enterprises = 20 to 100 employees, large enterprises = +100 employees   
 
- structural challenges all constrain access to finance for SMEs (Ministry of Finance, 2017a). Zambia’s ratio of domestic credit to private 
sector by banks as a percentage of GDP falls significantly below lower middle income countries and SSA countries. In 2017, the ratio stood 
at 11% for Zambia, 44% for lower middle income countries and 48% for SSA countries (World Bank, 2019). This ratio is a proxy for 
financial deepening which is the expansion or penetration of financial services (Erdene & Sun, 2014). It can be inferred that in relation to 
the size of Zambia’s economy, commercial bank lending to the private sector is not where it ideally should be. 
 
Private commercial banks, most of which are foreign-owned (12 of the 17 banks present in the country), dominate the local credit market 
in Zambia (Bank of Zambia, 2019b). In 2017, foreign-owned banks provided 69% of local credit (Bank of Zambia, 2017a). The 
concentration of a few banks limits competition in the banking and financial services sector which negatively affects more modestly-sized 
borrowers. There also exists a significant spread between lending rates and saving rates which is  as a result of limited competition and -
                                                 
1 The table indicates that larger enterprises require a greater proportional value of collateral than smaller enterprises which is counter-intuitive considering the higher risks 














Firms with a bank loan/line of credit 5.2% 13.9% 34.0% 8.8% 21.0% 31.6%
Firms whose recent loan application was rejected 52.8% 9.4% 0.0% 34.1% 15.1% 10.9%
Firms using banks to finance investments 8.2% 17.7% 24.7% 12.2% 20.0% 24.4%
Proportion of investments financed by banks 5.4% 7.2% 13.2% 6.6% 9.4% 13.8%
Proportion of investments financed internally 82.9% 75.9% 78.4% 80.5% 74.0% 71.7%
Proportion of loans requiring collateral 88.0% 92.1% 93.7% 90.6% 85.7% 79.2%
Value of collateral needed for a loan (% of loan amount) 239.7% 188.9% 314.2% 236.6% 215.6% 206.9%
Firms identifying access to finance as a major constraint 29.6% 24.2% 12.7% 27.4% 39.6% 25.4%
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- structural inadequacies (Ministry of Finance, 2017b).  
 
Looking over the past 10 years, lending peaked in 2014, but by 2017 the number of 
commercial bank borrowers had declined by 31% from the 2014 peak. Bank lending 
per capita increased at a dollar compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 6% from 
K792 ($206 or $240 in today’s dollars) in 2008 to K3,266 ($342 or $350 in today’s 
dollars) in 2017. Despite this increase in lending per capita, commercial banks cut back 
on lending as measured by loans as a proportion of total assets (Bank of Zambia, 
2017b). Figure 2 below shows that between 2008 and 2017, the proportion of loans 
advanced as a proportion of total assets by all Zambian commercial banks declined 
from 44% to 31% while investments in government securities as a proportion of total 
assets increased from 19% to 27% over the same period. The non-performing loan 
(NPL) ratio also increased from 7% in 2008 to 12% in 2017 (Bank of Zambia, 2017b). 
According to the Zambian Banking and Financial Services Act, NPLs are principle or 
interest repayments on loans that are more than 90 days in arrears (Zambia Legal 
Information Institute, 2019).  
 
Figure 2: Commercial bank asset structure 
 
Source: Adapted from Bank of Zambia (2008, 2017a) 
 
Based on the data, it appears that the local credit market has contracted over the last 
few years – NPL ratios have increased, allocations to loans and advances have declined 
and investments in stable government securities have increased. Looking at the –  
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- actions of banks, it would appear that they have become more risk averse. Because 
lending to SMEs is riskier than lending to large enterprises, this apparent risk aversion 
is likely to further constrain SME financing. 
 
The current credit environment is explained by the economic challenges that Zambia 
began experiencing in 2015. By the last quarter of 2015 the Zambian kwacha had 
depreciated significantly and a corresponding increase in food prices which saw 
inflation rise to 21% ensued. To lower inflation, the Central Bank raised interest rates 
which reduced enterprise access to credit and further impeded SME lending (Ministry 
of Finance, 2017a).  
 
For the SMEs that do obtain loans from banks, the average SME loan tenure in Zambia 
is 21 months (World Bank & IFC, 2013). This short-term credit means that SMEs are 
restricted in the investments that that they can make over a long period of time. Long-
term investments are necessary for growth. Different stages of a firm’s life cycle will 
place different demands on capital (Abor & Biekpe, 2009). As Table 1 shows, only 
12% of Zambian firms use banks to finance investments compared to 20% of SSA firms 
pointing towards under capitalisation. In 2017, the SME Forum in partnership with the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the World Bank, released a report on the 
global MSME financing gap. This report assumes that MSMEs employ between 0 and 
250 people (Bruhn et al., 2017). Zambia has an estimated 21,416 formal MSMEs with 
a total demand for $5.2 billion in financing. Out of this financing demand, it is estimated 
that $3.7 billion or 71% is unmet (World Bank Group, IFC, & SME Finance Forum, 
2017). It can be concluded that the formal SME market in Zambia is under capitalised 
and as such, its growth prospects are limited to the available capital. 
 
Alternative sources of capital for Zambian SMEs include the stock market and the bond 
market. Realistically, a SME is unlikely to list on the Lusaka Stock Exchange (LuSE) 
– the exchange is illiquid and heavily concentrated with a few firms. SMEs are also 
unlikely to meet the minimum listing requirements which include reporting 3 
consecutive years of profit as well as a host of compliance-related obligations and fees 
(Lusaka Stock Exchange, 2018). A quick review of the history of corporate bond 
issuances in Zambia shows that bonds are mostly utilised by large established 
enterprises (Lusaka Stock Exchange, 2014). 
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La Rocca, La Rocca, & Cariola (2011) make four hypotheses about capital structure 
decisions made over a business’s life cycle. Capital structure refers to the debt and 
equity mix used to finance businesses. Only two relevant hypotheses relevant to this 
study are highlighted below: 
 
The first hypothesis is the pecking order theory. The theory is that businesses lean more 
towards using internally sourced capital and only turn to external sources when these 
resources have been used up. Due to information asymmetry associated with their 
businesses, SMEs would rather use capital that is less sensitive to information needs. 
The preferred order of financing as the business grows is therefore, retained earnings, 
then debt and finally equity. Debt is only contracted out of necessity and the more 
profitable a firm is, the less reliance it places on debt since it is relying on retained 
earnings (La Rocca et al., 2011). In their study of SSA SMEs using Ghana as a focus, 
Abor & Biekpe (2009) find that more profitable firms use less debt in accordance with 
the pecking order theory. They also find that there exists a positive relationship between 
the growth of SMEs and their contraction of long term debt. 
 
The second hypothesis is different to the pecking order theory. It assumes that firms 
will rely on obtaining equity first, then retained earnings and finally debt. Due to 
information opacity, banks level higher interest rates against new businesses which 
limits them from obtaining debt. Firms turn to insiders, angel investors and venture 
capitalists (VCs). Equity is patient and can be invested for longer-term gains while 
allowing the robustness of the investment to be watched carefully. VCs assist the 
entrepreneur with skills development in addition to capital provision. Debt is only 
contracted after the firm has sufficient tangible assets to use as security. As the business 
grows, debt increases, especially at the maturity stage (La Rocca et al., 2011). 
 
In both the two hypotheses presented above, PE has a role to play in the capital structure 
of firms both at the early stage and later stage of their life cycles. This forms the premise 
of this research. Having shown that Zambian SMEs are under capitalised, bank debt 
supplied to SMEs is short-term and that debt supply has declined, PE financing is an 




1.3 Research objectives and questions  
To obtain a better understanding of PE as an alternative asset class that can bridge the 
SME financing gap described earlier, this research seeks to investigate what drives the 
decision of PE financiers to supply funds to enterprises in Zambia. 
 
Thus the research objectives and questions are as follows: 
 
Research Objective 1 (RO1): To determine what private equity financiers are looking 
for in potential Zambian investees. 
Research Question1 (RQ1): What drives private equity financing in Zambia? 
 
and 
Research Objective 2 (RO1): To determine what prevents private equity financiers from 
investing in Zambia. 
Research Question 2 (RQ1): What prevents private equity investments in Zambia? 
 
1.4 Justification of study 
Preliminary reviews indicate that the Zambian PE sector is relatively small. To bring 
this into perspective, the nearest African PE hubs in South Africa and Kenya have 118 
and 43 local PE offices respectively. Zambia has 7 (Asoko Insight, 2018). Obtaining 
detailed information about PE financing and PE firms in Zambia is challenging. Unlike 
publicly traded equities on a stock exchange, by its nature, PE operates in privacy. 
Because of the sizes of their PE industries, Kenya and South Africa have PE 
associations which publish reports containing relevant industry data. Zambia, however, 
is not yet at the stage where such an association is required. 
 
The preliminary review of literature reveals that there has not been an academic 
exploration of the determinants of PE investing with an exclusive focus on Zambia. The 
majority of the studies under taken have been on the determinants of investment in the 
United States and Europe. In the recent past, there have been studies undertaken on the 
determinants of PE investment in emerging market economies because of the high rate 




From a Western perspective, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, (1997) 
found that the legal environment impacted PE activity. Black & Gilson (1998) found 
that the presence of a stock market increased VC activity. Gompers & Lerner (1998) 
showed that a growing economy, capital gains taxes and the levels of research and 
development impacted VC activity in the USA. Romain & van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie (2003) found that higher corporate tax rates were a constraint to PE financing. 
 
From the emerging markets perspective, Groh's (2009) survey of international investors 
found that corporate governance and the protection of property rights were the most 
important determinants of PE investment. This was followed by the quality of 
management, expected deal flows and bribery and corruption. Divakaran, McGinnis, & 
Shariff (2014) identified unattractive regulatory environments, unwillingness of family-
owned businesses to give up shares, limited exit opportunities and western funding 
structures as constraints to PE financing in developing countries. 
 
Loos (2010) researched the determinants of PE investing in SSA and identified 
resources, returns, risk and the business environment as the key determinants. 
Babarinde (2012) explored the African continent and noted that a rising middle class, 
comparatively higher return on investment offerings and the participation of large 
international development finance institutions (DFIs) in PE financing all catalysed PE 
investment in Africa. 
 
IESE Business School developed a PE and VC attractiveness of index of 125 countries 
across the world. According to their latest ratings, Zambia was ranked 78th and the most 
important determinants of PE investment in Zambia were taxation, economic activity, 
investor protection and corporate governance. The constraints were human capital, 
depth of capital market and entrepreneurial opportunities (Groh, Lieser, Biesinger, & 
Liechtenstein, 2018). 
 
The IESE ranking is the only research where determinants and constraints pertaining to 
PE in Zambia are identifiable. However, it is limited in that, the factors affecting PE 
investment were not obtained directly from Fund Managers that make investments in 
Zambia. The researchers identified these factors through literature review. Using the 
factors that they considered most relevant to VC and PE, they measured and ranked the 
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attractiveness of each factor across 125 different countries. Because the factors are 
uniform and are spread across multiple regions, it is likely that the index fails to take 
into account unique, country-specific factors that affect one country and not the other. 
The difference with this research is that it intends to shed light on the specific factors 
that drive and constrain PE financing in Zambia by engaging with Fund Managers that 
are familiar with investing in the country. It is hoped that those who are unfamiliar with 
PE financing, are able to come away from reading this research with an improved 
awareness of how PE financing works in Zambia. It is also the expectation that the 
results will help SMEs broaden their financing options beyond commercial bank loans 
and also elicit some introspection on how they can make their enterprises attractive 
financing targets. 
 
1.5 Organisation of paper 
The next chapter will cover key PE terms and global trends, ending with an exploration 
of the historical PE trends in Zambia. Chapter 3, which is the Literature Review will 
outline the key theories and studies that underpin PE. The Literature Review will 
specifically highlight results of previous studies on the constraints and determinants of 
PE financing. Chapter 4 will outline the methodology involved in the research 
undertaking and Chapter 5 and 6 will present the results of the research and the 
conclusion respectively. The research will end with recommendations for policy makers 
and future researchers.  
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2.0 Background  
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is an overview of PE covering its definition, its structure and the general 
merits and demerits of its usage. The chapter also explores the historical trends of PE 
financing in the USA, Europe, Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter ends with a 
brief history of the PE industry in Zambia.  
 
2.2 Definition and structure of private equity 
(a) Private equity  
Private equity is defined as “an asset class consisting of equity securities and debt 
in companies not quoted on a public exchange” (Baker, Filbeck, & Kiymaz, 2012, 
p.3). The European Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (EVCA) adds 
that PE is a medium to long-term investment in high-growth or high-growth 
potential investees (EVCA, 2007). There are six major classes of PE investments: 
VC, growth capital, leveraged buyouts, mezzanine capital, distressed investments 
and funds of funds (Baker et al., 2015).  
 
(b) Private equity funds 
Institutional investors like pension funds, banks, insurance companies, 
endowments, development finance institutions, and high-net worth individuals use 
structured investment vehicles known as “funds” to make investments in various 
entities (Gilligan & Wright, 2014).  
 
Funds are managed by skilled fund managers also known as General Partners (GPs) 
who make investments on behalf of the investors or Limited Partners (LPs) (African 
Development Bank, 2017). The term GP and PE firm are used interchangeably. The 
fund established by the GP acts as an important financial intermediary between 
return-seeking investors and privately held companies that require capital (Sommer, 
2012). The funds are structured as limited partnerships between the GPs and the 
LPs, where the GPs handle the daily running, fund-raising and investment decisions 
of the fund. The failure or success of the investments lies solely with the GPs. To 
keep the LPs and GPs interests aligned, the GPs invest a negligible amount of their 
own money into the fund and are paid a management fee which is between 1% and 
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2% of the capital being managed. GPs also get carried interest or a performance fee 
upon realisation of the investment which is typically 20% of the capital gain made 
on the investment (D. J. Cumming & Johan, 2014; Divakaran et al., 2014).  
 
PE funds are typically closed-ended and mature after 10-12 years. After closing on 
fundraising, GPs make investments in the first 5 years of the fund’s existence which 
they return the LPs after 5 to 8 years (Sommer, 2012). The GPs’ objective is to 
invest in a diversified portfolio of privately held companies for growth purposes to 
increase shareholder value and long-term capital gains which the fund realises upon 
exit (Gilligan & Wright, 2014).  
 
Figure 3: Private equity business model 
 
Source: EVCA (2014, p.9) 
 
Overtime, the PE industry became more competitive forcing GPs to implement 
strategies to give them a competitive edge. These strategies included developing 
specialisations in specific industries and actively managing the operations of the 
investee (Gilligan & Wright, 2014).   
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This hands-on investment management style is known as a capital-plus approach 
involving the deliberate capacity building and strengthening of management and an 
emphasis on market development and growth (Divakaran et al., 2014).  
 
(c) Types of private equity 
Figure 4 on page 18 displays how some of the types of PE described below interact 
with the life cycle of a company in the developing world. 
 
Venture capital is equity that is invested “typically in less mature companies for the 
launch of a seed or start-up company, early stage development, or expansion of a 
business” (Divakaran et al., 2014, p.3). Seed and start-up capital are very small 
amounts given to the business owner to help prove their business concept. They 
typically involve angel investors (Metrick & Yasuda, 2010). Angel investors are 
wealthy individuals that fill the gap that VC firms (whose focus is on potential high-
growth firms) are unable to fill due to high risks and high fixed costs associated 
with undertaking such deals (Erickson & Vinturella, 2013). Early stage capital is 
given to businesses that are testing or piloting production or existing businesses that 
are less than 3 years old. At the early stage, a company would already have a 
business plan, a management team, and market studies in place. Normally 
institutional investors participate in this round of financing and the VC expends 
more effort on networking and business support than at later stages (Metrick & 
Yasuda, 2010). Expansion stage /mid-stage capital is working capital supplied to a 
company that is producing goods and has inventory, accounts payable and accounts 
receivable. The company may not be reporting a profit but the expansion capital is 
necessary for production expansion, marketing, or product development and 
improvements. At this stage, there are more institutional investors involved in 
financing the firm and the VC takes on the role of a strategist (Metrick & Yasuda, 
2010). 
 
Growth capital/equity lies between VC and leveraged buyouts. This type of 
investment is typically a minority or majority stake in the investee without the 
extensive usage of debt. It is used to propel growth, finance acquisitions or provide 
the investee company’s shareholders with liquidity. The PE firm works closely with 
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the investee company’s management to expedite improvements in operations and 
increases in revenue. Growth companies are normally established, well-managed 
businesses with strong management teams and the potential for high revenue growth 
(Venero Capital Advisors, 2018).  
 
Leveraged buyouts (LBOs) occur when, using a small proportion of equity and a 
large proportion of debt or leverage, the PE firm acquires a controlling stake in a 
mature business. (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). In order to provide the fund’s 
investors with a return, PE firms either recapitalise the target company using by 
using a high proportion of debt or use value-enhancing strategies that eliminate 
operating inefficiencies to restructure the entire business (Rauch & Umber, 2015).  
 
Mezzanine capital “refers to subordinated debt or preferred equity securities that 
often represent the most junior portion of a company’s capital structure that is senior 
to the company’s common equity” (Baker et al. 2015, p.3). Subordinated debt 
means that the debt is unsecured so the investor will demand a higher return than 
secured debt. The investor may also opt to preserve the company’s cash by 
converting interest repayments to equity. This is favourable to the business owner 
because it is less dilutive than a full equity investment and it preserves cash (EVCA, 
2007). It can either be a form of very late stage VC or an LBO (Metrick & Yasuda, 
2010).  
 
Distressed investments are debt and equity investments made specifically in 
companies that are in financial distress. Distress investment funds are structured 
like buyout funds, however the capital is invested in the target company’s debt 
securities as opposed to its equity. Funds may make these investments to obtain 
control of a company by converting the debt to equity. Another distressed investing 
strategy is to offer expensive rescue loans to very desperate target companies to 
refinance existing loans and revive the company. If the business fails to turnaround, 
the fund takes control. Finally, turnaround investments are equity placements in 
struggling companies that the investor hopes will turn its fortunes around (Moyer 
& Martin, 2015). 
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Figure 4: Financial life cycle of a company 
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Fund of funds (FoFs) are simply funds that invest in other funds. Funds invest in 
other funds to diversify their portfolio, tap into fund managers with specific 
expertise and to access certain market (Harris, Jenkinson, Kaplan, & Stucke, 2018).  
 
(d) Investment process 
The investment process is divided into four stages: selection, structuring, 
monitoring and exit. Selection involves screening and evaluating the potential 
investee against the firm’s standard investment criteria. 90% of all potential targets 
are rejected at this stage (Sommer, 2012). Privacy underpins PE and as such the PE 
industry tends to operate in an environment of secrecy because investee companies 
(often family-owned ventures) want to protect their intellectual property and 
privacy (Cendrowski, Petro, Martin, & Wadecki, 2012). The culture of privacy 
means PE firms must develop a very strong network of businesses to generate deal 
flows (Sommer, 2012). After the selection process, an offer is made to the investee 
and if accepted, a deal is structured. During this stage there is a detailed due 
diligence review covering the target’s financial statements, management, business 
prospects and legal matters. If the results of the due diligence are acceptable, a 
purchase price is added to the investment agreement as well as key aspects of 
ownership, governance, incentives and control. Once the deal is signed and closed 
the PE firm monitors the investment by taking a seat on the board. The GPs use 
their deep industry experience and networks to execute operational and financial 
improvements in the investee that ultimately increases its overall value. Lastly, an 
exit plan must be drawn with a defined method for exit either through a stock 
exchange listing, secondary buyout or full/partial private sale (Sommer, 2012). 
 
(e) Advantage and disadvantages of private equity 
Some of the most successful companies in the world were backed by PE investments 
mostly in the form of VC. These include Microsoft, Sun Micro Systems, Intel, 
Apple, Compaq , WhatsApp, Facebook, Alibaba, Google and Twitter (CB Insights, 
2019; Jeng & Wells, 2000).  
 
PE enables companies that would have otherwise been unable to grow, to 
experience tremendous success by focussing on business performance 
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improvements. PE firms help establish high performance management standards 
while providing strategic guidance and support, a vast network of contacts, 
improved visibility amongst bankers, suppliers and customers and, a stable 
partnership in which risks and rewards are shared (EVCA, 2007). 
 
The obvious disadvantage of PE to the entrepreneur is loss of control over the 
business. LBOs in particular face heavy criticism for saddling the target company 
with debt and cutting employee numbers to save costs. PE firms are also frequently 
accused of not paying their fair share of taxes and being more concerned about their 
earnings than the welfare of employees in their target companies (The Economist, 
2016). 
 
2.3 Global private equity history and trends 
(a) North America 
The genesis of the PE industry2 
Various modes of PE financing have existed since time immemorial. When it comes 
to the USA, its VC roots date back to the 1800s when private financiers helped 
develop the railroad and textile industries (Cendrowski et al., 2012).   
 
The First World War (WWI) marked the introduction of VC in the USA.  
The War Finance Corporation (WFC) founded in 1918 by the US Congress was 
responsible for financing war industries. It lent $71 million ($1 billion in today’s 
dollars) to banks during WWI. After WWI ended, WFC’s mandate allowed it to 
play a critical role in financing the rail and agricultural sectors. The WFC laid the 
ground work for the existence of future government-led investment funds for 
private enterprises (Cendrowski et al., 2012). 
 
Between 1929 and 1939, the USA experienced a period of difficult economic times 
known as the Great Depression. Small businesses bore the brunt of the Great 
Depression and many closed down. To remedy this, the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation was created in 1932. Its mission was to finance businesses through 
                                                 
2 This section is mainly adapted from Cendrowski et al. (2012) 
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loans. To help out small businesses, Congress created the Smaller War Plants 
Corporation (SWPC) in 1942 during World War II (WWII). The SPWC was the 
first government institution to lend money to private businesses only and it became 
a champion of small businesses, encouraging other larger providers of credit to 
follow in its footsteps (Cendrowski et al., 2012).  
 
Establishment of PE industry in the 20th century3 
In 1946, American Research and Development Corporation (ARD) recognised as 
“the first modern venture capital firm” was founded (Gompers & Lerner, 1998, 
p.151). ARD made investments in companies that were developing technology for 
WWII. In 1957 ARD invested $70,000 ($ 1 million in today’s dollars) in Digital 
Equipment Company. “Because institutional investors were reluctant to invest, 
ARD was structured as a publicly traded, closed-ended fund and marketed mostly 
to individuals” (Gompers & Lerner, 1998, p.152). Other VC firms formed after 
ARD followed a similar structural pattern.  
 
In 1953 the Small Business Administration was created to help entrepreneurs with 
training and financing. The Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) was 
founded in 1958 to finance and regulate private VC firms. The SBIC was the 
beginning of the VC industry as we know it. 
 
VC transformed from a small industry financed by the wealthy to a well-structured 
asset class. By the 1960s a strong stock exchange provided a viable exit for ARD 
and similar venture firms, earning them sizeable returns on their investments. The 
Digital Equipment Company was worth $355 million ($3 billion in today’s dollars). 
The sixties also heralded the introduction of the LBO (Cendrowski et al., 2012; 
Gompers & Lerner, 1998; Gordon, 2012). 
  
                                                 
3 This section is mainly adapted from Cendrowski et al. (2012) 
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A weak 1970s stock market weakened initial public offering (IPO) exits and the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) made the rules for pension 
fund investments stricter. Pension fund managers stopped investing in VC because 
it was deemed high risk. ERISA’s “Prudent Man Rule” was clarified in 1978, 
explicitly allowing pensions to invest in PE. Capital gains tax rates were also cut 
from 49.5% to 28% and then eventually to 20%, earning PE investors even greater 
return on their investments. LBOs surpassed VC –was spurred on by low interest 
rates on bank debt and low capital gains tax rates (Cendrowski et al., 2012). 
 
From the late 70s to the mid-90s PE and VC investments began to drop with a 
recession in the early 90s adding to the industry’s problems. VC returns dropped 
sharply from averages of 33% in the late 70s and early 80s to less than 12% in the 
late 80s and early 90s. LBO returns followed a similar pattern dropping from 35% 
to 13% over the same period. Commitments declined while real GDP growth 
remained stagnant (Cendrowski et al., 2012).  
 
The mid-90s saw a resurgence in US PE investments. It was also the beginning of 
the dot-com boom. From 1992 to 1995, the American GDP grew by 3% per annum 
which boosted the IPO market and its new darling – internet companies known as 
“dot-coms”. As IPOs delivered 100% returns on dot-coms, the investment 
atmosphere became euphoric. VC investments grew at a CAGR of 56% from $12 
billion ($20 billion in todays’ dollars) to $111 billion ($162 billion in today’s 
dollars) between 1995 and 2000. (Cendrowski et al., 2012). 
Figure 5: Commitments to USD PE Funds (1980-2010) 
 
Source: Cendrowski et al (2012, p.32)  
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21st Century boom and bust cycles4 
By the late 90s VC commitments were 6% higher than the combined total market 
capitalisation of the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ. VC was poured into 
start-ups that did not possess the business acumen to succeed and standard market-
based valuation fundamentals were disregarded in the quest to cash-in on the dot-
com frenzy. In 2000 the dot comb bubble burst and VC and PE began to decline. 
Returns on investments plummeted with investors losing 40% on their investments 
on average, fundraising declined at a CAGR of -36% from the 2000 high of $111 
billion ($162 billion in today’s dollars) to $29 billion ($40 billion in today’s dollars) 
in 3 years. The US PE industry ebbed until 2004 (Cendrowski et al., 2012). 
 
By 2005, the PE sector was rallying back and buyout funds had more than doubled 
within a year. In 2007 the value of PE and VC funds raised in the US were around 
$302 billion ($366 billion in today’s dollars) and deals were worth $938 billion ($1 
trillion in today’s dollars) (PitchBook, 2016b; Vijayakumar, 2008). Blackstone, one 
of the world’s largest PE and alternative asset management firms, successfully listed 
on the New York Stock  Exchange in 2007 (Baker et al., 2015). This positive 
sentiment, however, was short-lived. The collapse of Bear Stearns, Lehman 
Brothers and the 2008 global financial crisis created deep uncertainty. Investors 
held off investing in PE funds due to liquidity constraints and portfolio erosion 
(Cendrowski et al., 2012) . 
 
The period after the financial crisis was a period of recovery. Funds raised for US 
PE and VC were at their lowest value of around $70 billion ($102 billion in today’s 
dollars) in 2010 (Lewis, 2018). Because of the weaknesses in the design of the 
financial system exposed by the global financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act was enacted in 2010, regulating the 
previously unregulated PE industry. Now PE firms had to be registered with the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), disclose information to SEC and in some 
cases be brought under the supervision of the Federal Reserve (Baker et al., 2015). 
                                                 




The US PE market today 
As at 2017, US PE funds raised stood at $233 billion ($239 billion in today’s 
dollars) across 247 funds and an estimated 4,053 deals were made at a value of $538 
billion ($551 billion in today’s dollars) (PitchBook, 2018b). Dealmakers were 
concerned about insufficient quality targets and ever increasing competition – 
between 2000 and 2016 the number of global PE firms had tripled in number (Bain 
& Company, 2018b; Heberlein, 2017). 
Figure 6: US PE Activity (2006-2017) 
 
Source: PitchBook (2016, 2018) 
PE firms also faced increased competition from highly liquid corporates that 
participated directly in acquisitions. Dry powder, which is capital that is yet to be 
invested, was also a source of concern, increasing year-on-year (Bain & Company, 
2018b; Heberlein, 2017; PitchBook, 2018b).  The most popular sectors for PE 
investment in 2017 were the information technology (IT), healthcare, business to 
business and business to consumer sectors (Bain & Company, 2018b).   
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Figure 7: US VC Activity (2006-2017) 
 
Source: PitchBook (2018b)  
 
In 2017 American VCs made $84 billion ($86 billion in today’s dollars) in 
investments spread across 8,076 closed deals – this was the highest level of 
investment since the 2000 internet bubble era. Unicorn investments (individual 
investments in excess of $1 billion) were also at their highest level in VC history. 
The investment focus shifted to companies over 5 years old, due to the need for 
resilient KPIs given the increase in deal sizes. (PitchBook, 2018c). However, this 
approach resulted in a decline in early-stage investing which is key to the VC 
ecosystem. (Kilroy, 2018).  
Figure 8: US VC Activity (2006-2017) 
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1990s and the dot-com era 
Between 1995 and 2000, European PE investments experienced an astronomical 
increase in size at a dollar CAGR of 54% from around €5 billion ($5 billion or $9 
billion in today’s dollars) to close to €50 billion ($46 billion or $67 billion in today’s 
dollars). As with the US PE market at the time, the growth in this sector was 
bolstered by the boom in the high-technology industry space. The Euro as a single 
currency created a more connected market for European debt and equity to flourish. 
The Euro also increased competitiveness between firms which positively influenced 
the growth of PE in Europe (European Central Bank, 2005). Changes in Basel II 
banking regulations in the 1990s restricted the ability of banks, for example in 
Germany, to finance risky investments, which pushed the demand for PE upwards 
(Sommer, 2012).  
 
When the dot-com bubble burst in the US in 2000, the resultant slump in stock 
market prices lead to a substantial decline in European PE activity which dropped 
at a dollar CAGR of -5% from the 2000 high of close to €50 billion ($46 billion or 
$67 billion in today’s dollars) in investments to just under €30 billion ($37 billion 
or $50 billion in today’s dollars) in investments by 2004. In response to the lessons 
learnt in the dot-com era, PE sought less risky investments and LBOs in more 
mature sectors as a portion of investments began to increase (European Central 
Bank, 2005). 
 
Post dot-com era 
Before 2003, the prudential choices of European pension funds and insurance 
companies were determined by their respective governments. However, in 2002 and 
2003 the European Commission issued legislation that stopped insurance 
companies and pension funds respectively from adhering to national legislation that 
prevented them from investing in risk capital markets i.e. VC. This changed the 
fundraising dynamic and in 2006 pension funds overtook banks and became the 
biggest source of funds for PE investments. Also as a result of this change in 
regulation, VC funding levels increased in countries like Sweden, Denmark and 
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Finland placing their investment as a percentage of GDP at par with the US (Popov 
& Roosenboom, 2009).  
 
By 2006, European PE fundraising had broken its own records as shown by Figure 
9, raising an unprecedented €112 billion ($141 billion or $175 billion in today’s 
dollars), its highest level of fundraising to date. The largest contributors to these 
funds were the USA, the United Kingdom and France (Thomson Financial, EVCA, 
& PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2007).   
 
2008 Global financial crisis 
In 2008, the global financial crisis resulted in the contraction of the US credit market 
by 80%, choking the availability of syndicated loans which were used to back LBOs 
(Sommer, 2012). By 2009, fundraising, investments and divestments fell to their 
lowest levels since 1999 at a dollar CAGR of -31% from 2006 to 2009. Between 
2006 and 2009, fundraising dropped from €112 billion ($141 billion or $175 billion 
in today’s dollars) to €20 billion ($28 billion or $33 billion in today’s dollars), 
investments dropped from €71 billion ($89 billion or $111 billion in today’s dollars) 
to €28 billion ($39 billion or $46 billion in today’s dollars) and divestments from 
€33 billion ($41 billion or $52 billion in today’s dollars) to €16 billion ($22 billion 
or $26 billion in today’s dollars) (see Figure 9). However, with the crisis also came 
opportunity - rescue and turn around deals increased by 40% in 2009 from 2008 
(EVCA, 2009). 
 
European PE market today 
As at 2017, the European PE market had recovered from the crippling effects of the 
2008 crisis. Fundraising had increased and was at its highest level since 2006, 
standing at an impressive €92 billion ($104 billion or $106 billion in today’s 
dollars). Funds had primarily been provided by pension funds (29%), FoFs (20%), 
family offices and private individuals (15%), sovereign wealth funds (9%) and 
insurance companies (8%). Non-European institutional investors provided more 




Buyout investments which stood at €72 billion ($81 billion or $83 billion in today’s 
dollars), had increased year on year by 29% and continued to be historically higher 
than VC activity whose fundraising has declined from 2016’s record year (Invest 
Europe, 2018). Axelson & Martinovic (2015) note that European entrepreneurs had 
been smaller in number because of the societal stigma associated with business 
failure and personal bankruptcy filings. European VCs had also been criticised for 
not possessing sufficient expertise in VC.  
 
Sectors of PE and VC investment tend to mirror those of the USA. The most popular 
PE investments sectors are business services, consumer, industrials and chemicals, 
technology, media and telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, medical and biotech 
and financial services. Ireland and UK are the biggest markets for European 
buyouts, however, fund managers are cautious about financing companies in the 
UK and Ireland in light of their exposure to the effects of inflation caused by Brexit 
(Naydenova & Roberts, 2018). 
 
Despite fund managers’ concerns about Brexit, the UK and Ireland still remain the 
biggest markets for European PE (30%) and VC (38%) (PitchBook, 2018a). The 
Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) and DACH (Germany, 
Austria and Switzerland) regions are the third and fourth most popular investment 
destinations. 
 
According to PricewaterhouseCoopers’s Naydenova and Roberts (2018), it is likely 
that the UK will continue to lead the PE market in the years to come. Groh, von 
Liechtenstein, & Lieser (2010) also ranked the UK as number one in their European 
VC and PE attractiveness indices. The index showed that the UK outperformed 
other European nations on investor protection and corporate governance scores due 
to its legal history of protecting minority shareholders and the depth of its capital 
markets. 
The Financial Times reported that until recently, London was the world’s top global 




Figure 9: Overview of European private equity fundraising, investing and divesting (1997–2017) 
 
Source: Invest Europe (2018. p.5)*this data is a summation of both venture capital and private equity. 
 
- York City into the top spot while questions continue to arise over the London’s ability to sustain its capital attractiveness (Murphy, 
2018). The short-term outlook for the European PE market is positive. A survey of fund managers across Europe performed by Roland 
Berger indicates that more PE-backed mergers and acquisitions are expected with the most sought after industries being 
pharmaceuticals, business services, technology and media & telecommunications. The managers also see divestment as a key priority 




Figure 10: European venture capital fundraising and investing activity (2006-
2017) 
 
Source: PitchBook (2016a, 2018a) 
 
(c) Asia 
Early history of private equity financing in Asia 
The Asian PE industry was founded in late 1980s by a few individuals to take 
advantage of the opportunity to buy into the continent’s growing consumer market 
and to assist with outsourcing of Western companies to the region (AVCJ, 2012). 
Before the 80s, the market had been existence for decades, it just was not formally 
organised and structured like Western PE. Funds were often provided by banks or 
wealthy families (Prahl, 2010).  
 
From 1992 to 1998, foreign direct investment flowed into Asia, growing at a CAGR 
of 19%. Bank financing was only accessible to a small set of companies which 
increased the demand for PE. Between 1992 and 1999, $50 billion ($75 billion in 
today’s dollars) was raised for Asian investments. These funds did not perform well 
due to poor corporate governance standards, information asymmetry, poor legal 
systems, limited exit prospects and lack of experience amongst Asian fund 
managers (Prahl, 2010). The Asian market’s problems were deepened further by the 
effects of the Asian financial crisis of 1997 - volatile currency fluctuations and 
increased market risk (Prahl, 2010). As with all financial crises, it presented PE 
firms with buyout opportunities for distressed companies (AVCJ, 2012). Distressed 
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companies in Indonesia, Korea and Japan became sought after targets for investors 
and yielded satisfactory returns. Shinsei Bank in Japan is an example of one such 
investment that yielded more than 6 times return on investment for the PE firm 
Ripplewood (Prahl, 2010). Consequently, several Western firms flocked to the 
region to set-up bases there to tap into the new market (AVCJ, 2012). Investments 
were mostly focussed on early-stage capital but the deals were of sub-standard 
quality because the industry lacked maturity. When the dot-com bubble burst in 
2000, risk averse investors moved their investments to safer markets (Prahl, 2010). 
 
One of the significant catalysts for growth of the Asian PE market was China joining 
the World Trade Organisation in 2001. This was a very clear indicator to PE 
investors that China was open to investment (AVCJ, 2012). Deals flowing to Asia 
after 2001 were mostly buyouts and expansion investments. With the presence of 
large international firms in the local market, the Asians benefited from learning 
more about the benefits of PE. These firms advocated for regulatory reforms and 
proved that they could make returns on their investments. The Asian market 
transformed and nations like Vietnam, India and China that opened themselves up 
to PE from international firms now possess a substantial share of the Asian PE 
market (Prahl, 2010). 
Figure 11: Asian private equity buyout deals (2006-2015) 
 
Source: Preqin (2015) 
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As Figures 11 and 12 show, the aggregate deal value of buyout and VC investments 
in Asia has increased steadily over time. The number of buyout deals has decreased 
in number while the value has increased. For VC, both the deal value and the 
number of deals have increased.  
 
Figure 12: Asian private equity buyout deals (2007-2015) 
 
Source: Preqin (2015) 
 
Private equity in Asia today 
Between 2007 and 2017, Asia increased its share of the global PE market from 9% 
to 23% (Bain & Company, 2018a). As at 2017, the Asian PE market’s investments 
stood at $158 billion ($162 billion in today’s dollars) up 38% from 2016, placing 
the region ahead of Europe for the first time in history. When compared against 
other markets, the Asian region continually experiences strong economic growth 
making it an attractive market for investment (Kodaira, 2018). According to 
Yamashita (2018), because Asia is responsible for driving two-thirds of global 
economic growth, long-term investment funds find the region attractive. Asia is also 
experiencing a generational shift as reported by the Financial Times. 
Older/founding generations are more willing to sell their business stakes especially 
when the process of handing over the company to their heirs sours family 
relationships (Weinland, 2018). The Carlyle Group established a $7 billion Asia 
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fund while the Blackstone Group closed on a $2 billion Asian-focussed fund in June 
2018 (Kodaira, 2018).  
 
China and India 
China, Japan and India are the region’s leaders for investment (Bain & Company, 
2018a). Both China and India have implemented economic reforms that have eased 
the way of doing business and contributed to increased economic growth. With 
populations in excess of 1.3 billion each, they share a large pool of low-cost labour 
resources that adds to their appeal (Ippolito, 2007). 
 
India has chosen to make improvement in its institutional framework, productivity 
and IT exports as a path to development. However, low savings and insufficient 
infrastructure have hindered its growth potential (Ippolito, 2007). As a result of 
these infrastructural weaknesses, the Indian infrastructure market has become a 
prime investment area. Blackstone made a $1 billion real estate deal in Indian Bulls 
Real Estate while Macquarie made a highway operation contract for $1 billon 
(Yamashita, 2018).  
 
China followed the traditional East Asian export-led growth model focussing on 
manufacturing. Capital accumulation generated from foreign direct investment and 
high savings were ploughed back into infrastructure to build scale and make the 
country an even more attractive investment destination (Ippolito, 2007). Today, the 
most popular sector of interest for funds in China is the innovative start-up 
technology space, given that it is now moving away from manufacturing to being 
more of a consumer-driven market. Ant Financial which operates Alipay and is an 
affiliate of the Alibaba Group managed to raise $14 billion in Series C funding from 
VC investors, making it the single largest fundraising of its kind in history (Albers-
Schoenberg, 2018; Yamashita, 2018). Of the 10 largest deals reported in the Asian 
region as at June 2018, China obtained 6 at a total of $23 billion. Chinese early stage 
investments received $56 billion by June 2018, surpassing similar American 
companies that received $42 billion. Between 2010 and 2017, early stage 
investments in China increased by more than 14 times to $64 billion ($66 billion in 
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today’s dollars). (Albers-Schoenberg, 2018). Despite this success, the recent trade 
war that has arisen between China and the USA under the Trump administration 
may restrict American funds investing in China and vice-versa. (Yamashita, 2018).  
 
(d) Sub-Saharan Africa 
The development of the PE sector within the SSA region was initiated by DFIs in 
the 1990s. Before embarking on this new financing strategy, DFIs had focussed on 
assisting African governments with debt security for development-related projects. 
With time, they extended their focus to investing in independent private companies 
that did not have government ties. PE firms with an African mandate emerged in 
the 1990s primarily out of South Africa. In 1997, $1 billion ($2 billion in today’s 
dollars) had been raised by 12 PE funds for African investments mostly centred on 
South Africa. However, the funds also began investing in other African countries 
like, Botswana, Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Most of the investments were under 
$5 million ($8 million in today’s dollars) (AVCA, 2014). 
According to Figure 13 between 2002 and 2006, PE flows in the SSA region were 
just over $6 billion ($7 billion in today’s dollars) with South Africa receiving at 
least half of these inflows (African Development Bank, 2012). 
 
Figure 13: Private equity flows in Sub-Saharan Africa (2002-2011) 
 




Due to the effects of the financial crisis, inflows declined steadily between 2007 
and 2009, at which point, they were at their lowest level since 2005. Despite the 
shocks of the financial crisis, momentum in SSA was stronger than in other 
developing regions. However, the region still received a comparably lower share of 
PE than other developing nations (African Development Bank, 2017; Maimbo, 
Faye, & Triki, 2011). 
 
In 2013, $330 billion ($356 billion in today’s dollars) was raised around the world 
for PE funds, of which only 3% was allocated to SSA. (Oxford Analytica, 2014; 
Tyson, 2015). There were more than 200 PE funds targeting investments in Africa. 
Investment strategies varied between generalist, sector-specific, country-specific 
and regional-specific. DFIs continued to play an important role in the industry, often 
backing fund managers that others were unwilling to fund. They also anchored PE 
funds and attracted more investors (AVCA, 2014). Most investments made in 
Africa were no more than $50 million ($54 million in today’s dollars). The average 
ratio of PE investments to the GDP of the SSA region was 0.09% in 2012 compared 
to 0.86% in the USA. The dominant global PE firms with funds dedicated to the 
SSA region were The Abraaj Group, Helios Investment Partners, The Blackstone 
Group, KKR & Co., The Carlyle Group and Actis Capital (Oxford Analytica, 2014). 
 
PE in Africa today 
Data for fundraising and deal flows in the SSA region exclusively as at 2017 has 
been challenging to obtain, however data for the African continent as a whole 
indicates that in 2017, the region raised over $2 billion in funds for investments 
(RisCura, 2018). According to the African Venture Capital Association (AVCA), 
in 2017, $4 billion in investments were made in the African region, a number 
unchanged from 2016 (AVCA, 2018b).    
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Figure 14: African private equity fundraising (2010–2017) 
*  
Source: RisCura (2018, p.30) 
 
PE investments in Africa were mostly focussed on growth. The African outlook is 
ever evolving and emerging industries and changing demographics mean that PE 
financing is mostly expansionary in nature. This expansionary focus helps 
businesses occupy most of the value chain. Because Africa is still developing, PE 
financiers in Africa prefer to take minority states in investments alongside 
management who maintain ownership of the companies. To protect the PE firms’ 
interests, financing contracts are arranged in such a manner as to still give the PE 
firm a strong influence on the company’s governance, decision-making and 
direction (AVCA, 2014). PE firms in developing nations also typically target larger, 
more established operations with average investments of $10 million (Divakaran et 
al., 2014).  
 
Deal activity shows that the most popular regions for PE financing in the SSA 
region between 2012 and 2017 were Southern Africa, East Africa and West Africa, 
accounting for 72% of deal activity in Africa. In terms of actual deal value, the most 
popular regions were West Africa ($11 billion), Southern Africa ($4 billion), and 
East Africa ($2 billion) (AVCA, 2018a). The most popular sectors were consumer, 





West Africa is dominated by Nigeria. Nigeria is the largest PE market in the West 
African region, accounting for 42% of deal volume and 73% of deal value. In 2017, 
the Nigerian government made very specific efforts to improve the ease of doing 
business. It established the usage of an online registration portal for companies and 
created a foreign exchange window for investors and exporters to aid in liquidity. 
Changes in pension fund investing regulations allowed funds greater leeway in 
investing in PE and infrastructure (AVCA, 2018a). Because PE investors favour 
markets with growing populations to consume goods, Nigeria is an attractive 




South Africa is the PE investment destination of choice in Southern Africa with  
73% of investment deals by volume and 74% by value (AVCA, 2018a). In the past, 
South Africa was the most popular destination in the whole of Africa due to its 
economic stability and development.(Oxford Analytica, 2014; Tyson, 2015). 
However, due to persistently poor GDP growth rates, increasing unemployment 
levels and growing political uncertainty, by 2017, it only possessed a 31% share of 
deals in Africa, losing 19% of its investment shares to Nigeria and Kenya (RisCura, 
2018). The Southern African Venture Capital Association reported that in 2017, 
South African PE attracted R31 billion in investments which is equivalent to around 
$2 billion (SAVCA, 2018). Despite the economic challenges that South Africa 
faced in 2017, it still remained a premier choice for PE investments because of its 
well advanced and integrated financial system (Deloitte, 2017). 
 
Areas of PE investment focus in South Africa are the food and beverage industry, 
manufacturing and financial services industries. Investors are more focussed on 







East Africa is now the most attractive PE investment destination in Africa according 
AVCA’s 2017 annual LP survey. 85% of LPs surveyed expressed a desire to invest 
in the region (AVCA, 2017). The region also led fundraising within SSA in 2017 
(Deloitte, 2017). Kenya held 49% of deals by value and 56% of deals by volume 
between 2012 and 2017 in the East African region (AVCA, 2018a).  
 
Kenya has a sizeable economy that is not reliant on the extractive industry (RisCura, 
2018). ‘Silicon Savannah’ is Kenya’s technology sector which is growing rapidly 
and attracts a lot of investor interest. The country has substantial smart phone 
penetration, skilled IT developers and a good business environment thanks to 
government reforms (Business Daily Africa, 2018). It is anticipated that 
agriculture/agribusiness, financial services and health care and pharmaceutical 
ventures will take the lead in East Africa due to its economic growth, desire for 
investors to invest along the value chain and increasing middle class population. 
The region is also supported by an innovative financial services sector that is well 
managed and underpinned by a highly integrated region (Deloitte, 2017).  
 
(e) Zambia 
1964 - 19915 
In 1964, newly independent Zambia was one of the most industrialised and 
urbanised independent nations in Africa with a GNP twice the size of South Korea’s 
standing at $2 billion ($16 billion in today’s dollars). The country’s wealth came 
primarily from copper mining (Rakner, 2003). 
 
From 1968 to 1971, the then president of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda oversaw the 
nationalisation of significant parts of the economy. The Zambia Industrial and 
Mining Corporation was created to manage the state’s investments. Between 1964 
and 1971, parastatals increased in number from 14 to 147 and by the mid-70s, 80% 
of the Zambian economy was controlled by the state. By 1972, Kaunda had 
                                                 
5 This section is mainly adapted from Rakner (2003) 
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abolished the previous two-party political system and established a one-party state 
(Rakner, 2003). 
 
Kenneth Kaunda’s leadership principles were based on Humanism. He sought to 
hold on to African traditions in a non-capitalist manner whilst pursuing economic 
growth. Under the Kaunda era, the Mulungushi Reforms and the Humanism 
philosophy discouraged private sector lobbying and business ownership. Because 
90% of the government’s revenue came from mining, other industries within the 
public and private sector were neglected. The Kaunda era was also marked by trade 
restrictions, price restrictions and exchange rate controls. (Rakner, 2003).  
 
By 1974, global copper prices experienced an extreme decline while oil prices 
began to increase. The Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries oil crisis, 
global recession, global production cuts and global uncertainty negatively impacted 
Zambia. From the 1970s to the 1990s, Zambia’s real per capita growth declined by 
30%. International Monetary Fund structural adjustment programmes implemented 
to stabilise the economy proved to be very unpopular. Zambia embraced multi-party 
democracy and President Frederick Chiluba was ushered into power in 1991 
(Rakner, 2003).  
 
1991 - 2001 
The new government embarked on a strategy of trade liberalisation and privatisation 
of state owned enterprises. Unfortunately, its economic policies were haphazard and 
created mistrust within the business community. Political uncertainty, public sector 
over spending and tight monetary policy did nothing to encourage the local business 
community. The privatisation exercise was also a contentious matter with 
allegations of corruption and critics pointing out that instead of creating more 
locally owned businesses and enterprises, the state had simply shifted ownership 
from itself to foreign interests (Rakner, 2003). The new government did manage to 
do away with price controls, liberalise interest rates, eliminate foreign exchange rate 
controls, promote free entry investment in most economic sectors, and abolish 
quantitative import restrictions (OECD, 2011). 
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While Zambia still relied on mining, its manufacturing sector waned and retail trade 
activities increased. A few family run medium-sized businesses emerged often run 
by indigenous Zambians. Driven by retrenchments and unemployment, the formal 
and informal SME sector began to grow in the areas of petty trade and business. It 
must be noted that often, those participating in informal trade, were doing so not by 
choice but due to unemployment. In 1996, the Small Enterprise Development Act 
was written into law. It provided incentives such as 3-year tax exemptions for 
businesses in urban areas of a certain size (NORAD, 2002).  
 
In 1996, the Zambia Venture Capital Fund (ZVCF) was created. It was the first VC 
and PE fund to be set up in Zambia. It was created and funded by the then 
Commonwealth Development Corporation now known as CDC Group plc (CDC), 
the European Investment Bank, DEG of Germany, Swedfund of Sweden, Sanlam 
of South Africa and the First Merchant Bank of Zambia (Times of Zambia, 1999).  
 
By 1999, the ZVCF had invested close to $13 million ($19 million in today’s 
dollars) in 11 different ventures with significant growth potential across the tourism, 
agriculture and services industries. Half of its investments at the time were made in 
Zambian-owned businesses. ZVCF’s investments included Manda Hill Mall, 
Zambia’s first shopping mall (Times of Zambia, 1999). Amongst its 
accomplishments, ZVCF oversaw the very first private management buyout in 
Zambia of Hybrid Poultry Farm (Commonwealth Development Corporation, 1998). 
 
2002 to present 
As at 2002, economic reforms had managed to reverse the previous reliance of the 
economy on the state. The economy of Zambia was now 80% in the hands of the 
private sector. However, high interest rates, poor infrastructure and an unreliable 
judiciary undermined private sector development (NORAD, 2002). 
 
At the time there were bilateral investment funds operational in Zambia through 
DFIs such as Investment Fund for Developing Nations (IFU) of Denmark, 
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Swedfund of Sweden, FMO (Dutch Development Bank) and CDC of the United 
Kingdom. CDC was the biggest DFI investor in Zambia, holding about $100 million 
($140 million in today’s dollars) in different sectors with a focus on the mining and 
agricultural sectors (NORAD, 2002). 
 
By 2006, the ZVCF had wound down and until 2009, the country was without a 
local VC and PE firm. Kukula Capital, founded in 2009, was a joint venture between 
Zambian and Danish financiers and enjoyed moderate success as a pioneer PE and 
VC firm in Zambia. It is still in existence today and employs a debt-equity financing 
mix to invest in Zambian SMEs. It currently oversees 6 equity investments in the 
agri-products and consumer industries which have created about 170 jobs (Kukula 
Capital, 2017). The fund has also managed to make 1 successful exit (Kukula 
Capital, 2017). 
 
Historically and presently, major international DFIs like CDC and the IFC continue 
to play a pivotal role in anchoring PE investments in Zambia. With their focus on 
making an impact, experience working in emerging markets and a large pool of 
funds to invest from, they are in a position to make riskier investments in developing 
countries like Zambia that other purely commercial firms are unwilling to make. 
This in effect de-risks the investment and encourages other firms to invest in local 
funds or ventures. 
 
IFC invested $2 million in equity in Madison Financial Services Zambia to deepen 
the financial services sector in Zambia in 2007 (IFC, 2007). It successfully exited 
the business through an IPO on the LuSE in 2014 (Lusaka Times, 2014). CDC 
acquired a $65 million ($68 million in today’s dollars) 17.5% stake in Zambeef Plc 
in 2016 (CDC Group, 2016). Zambeef is the largest food processing company in 
Zambia and is listed on the LuSE. Prior to the Zambeef investment, past CDC 
investments in Zambia included the investment in Chilanga Cement which was 
purchased by Lafarge Holcim in 2001 and IHS Towers of Strength (a multi-national 
company that constructs telecommunications towers). Emerging Capital Partners 
(ECP), has invested over $50m in Zambia. Past investments were in the mobile 
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telecommunications company Celtel which was sold off to Airtel and in Blue 
Financial Services. Currently ECP has one running investment in Zambia in IHS 
Towers of Strength (Emerging Capital Partners, 2017). Phatisa, a sector-specific PE 
firm with a Sub-Saharan outlook invested $24 million ($25 million in today’s 
dollars) in Golden Lay Zambia, a chicken egg producer and distributor in 2012. In 
2016, it invested an undisclosed amount in Camland Estates, a residential property 
development in Lusaka, the capital city of Zambia. (AAFTA, 2012). 
 
Zambian pension fund regulations appear to restrict local investment in PE funds. 
Out of approximately $2 billion in assets under management as at June 2013, 
Zambian pension funds had invested $3 9million ($42 million in today’s dollars) in 
PE funds. For a pension fund to invest in PE, it needs the approval of the registrar 
– discretionary conditions may then be set for the investment. No specific allocation 
class has been recognised for PE, so it may fall under unlisted securities or more 
likely under collective investment schemes. Investment guidelines prohibit funds 
from making speculative investments making PE financing quite difficult to 
undertake (Ashiagbor, Satyamurthy, Casey, & Asare, 2014). 
 
The Securities and Exchange Commission only recently recognised PE funds under 
collective investment schemes in 2016 and there is still much room for regulatory 
improvements in this regard (The Securities and Exchange Commission, 2016). 
 
As stated in Chapter 1, there are 7 PE firms operational in Zambia out of 214 firms 
across the SSA region. There is a push for more SMEs to participate in PE financing. 
Local Zambian PE investment professionals Bright Nundwe of Inside Capital 
Partners and Valentine Chitalu of CDC and Phatisa are encouraging SMEs to 
broaden their financing scope and strategy beyond debt financing in a bid to tap into 
the rapid growth and expansion that PE financing offers (Chitalu, 2014; Mulambia, 
2015).  
 
The long-term outlook for PE financing in Zambia is positive. Zambia ranks 78th in 
the world in the 2018 IESE Business School annual VC and PE global attractiveness 
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index. The index examines economic activity, depth of capital markets, taxation, 
investor protection and corporate governance, human and social environment, and 
entrepreneurial culture and deal opportunities in arriving at their scores. 125 
countries around the world form the attractiveness index. In Africa, Zambia was the 
7th most attractive country for PE and VC investments (Groh et al., 2018). 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter defined PE, described its structure and discussed the advantages and 
disadvantages of its usage. It explored the history of PE across the USA, Europe, Asia 
and Sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter ended with a review of Zambia’s private sector 





3.0 Literature review  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The first part of this chapter explores the theory behind domestic investment levels, 
foreign direct investment and firm-specific investments in order to set the theoretical 
framework for PE investment determinants. In the second part of the chapter, empirical 
studies that test the determinants of PE investment across the USA, Europe, Asia and 
Africa are explored. The objective of the empirical review is to outline past research 
results, to identify common trends in the results, to observe methodologies used and to 
identify any particular gaps in the literature. The literature examined covers both PE 
and VC, however, it is expected that the value of the conclusions drawn from these 
studies will not be altered by this duality.   
 
3.2 Theory on determinants of investment 
Generally, the factors that affect PE investment are split between macroeconomic 
factors and firm-specific factors.  
 
(a) Determinants of domestic investment6 
The neoclassical theory of investment indicates that there exists a positive 
relationship between the growth rate of real output and investment. As the aggregate 
demand changes for output, investors strive to meet that demand (Fielding, 1993, 
1997; Wai & Wong, 1982). Oshikoya, (1994) observed a relationship between 
macroeconomic variables and private investment levels in middle and low income 
African countries in the 1970s and 1980s. Specifically, he observed that slower 
economic growth resulted in lower private investment levels.  
 
Other literature suggest that government policies also impact domestic investment 
levels. Consumption spending may have the effect of raising interest rates, reducing 
market funds and increasing distortionary taxes which crowds out investment. 
Government borrowings, if not repaid timeously, may also strain the country’s 
                                                 
6 This section is primarily based on Ndikumana’s (2000) paper. 
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financial system and lower investment. Inefficient government policies which result 
in higher inflation and instability have been visible in several African countries. 
Inflation is product of the quality of decision-making. High levels of inflation and 
instability create uncertainty and depress investments (Ndikumana, 2000). Investors 
are generally not incentivised to make any investments in countries where the 
government does not appear to be in control of the macro-economy (Fischer, 1993). 
 
Domestic investment levels are also impacted by the country’s openness, namely 
its import and export flows. Increasing levels of exports can contribute to increased 
levels of foreign exchange which can be used to pay for imported capital goods and 
enlarge the domestic product market. The enlargement of the domestic product 
market positively affects investment. Imports of mostly consumer goods have the 
reverse effect on investment levels and discourage domestic production 
(Ndikumana, 2000).  
 
(b) Determinants of foreign direct investment7 
As described in Chapter 2, there has been a significant increase in PE flows in 
emerging market regions like South East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa from the 
1990s to date. A significant portion of this capital is from Western nations. Agmon 
& Messica (2009) put forward the notion that PE in emerging markets is a form of 
foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI is defined as occurring when “firms from 
developed countries export specific factors of production (their ownership 
advantage) to small countries and emerging markets (new locations) as a way to 
generate value to all stakeholders.” (p.12). In this case, foreign PE funds export risk 
capital to emerging market economies (Agmon & Messica, 2009). 
 
With respect to the drivers of FDI specifically, Dunning's (1977, 1993) Ownership 
Location Internalisation framework is used to describe the principal determinants 
of FDI. Ownership advantages like property rights, expertise, and patents give the 
give foreign firms a fair chance to compete in foreign markets. The location 
                                                 
7 This section is based primarily on Anyanwu's (2012) paper.  
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advantages are the unique factors that make the foreign country attractive. Location 
advantages include natural resources, skilled labour, culture, macroeconomic 
stability and government policies. Internalisation advantages arise as a result of 
taking advantage of external market imperfections like uncertainty and high 
transaction costs to create knowledge more efficiently. FDI is motivated by the 
opportunity to obtain resources, access a foreign market, exploit inefficiencies and 
obtain strategic assets (Dunning, 1993).  
 
On modelling the policy and non-policy determinants of FDI, Mateev (2009) 
suggests that government policies in relation to taxation, openness, labour, and 
infrastructure drive FDI. The size of the foreign market, transportation costs, 
economic stability and political stability are some of the non-policy factors that FDI 
investors take into account too. 
 
Sekkat and Veganzones-Varoudakis (2007) identify economic factors, trade and 
exchange market policies and the investment climate as broad FDI drivers. 
Economic factors include the rate of return on investments and the size of foreign 
market. Trade and foreign exchange factors consider the volatility of the exchange 
rates and liberalisation (Froot & Stein, 1991). General investment climate factors 
depend on cost of labour, education standards, access to skilled labour, political 
risk, GDP growth rate, urbanisation, political stability and the legal 
environment(Schneider & Frey, 1985). 
 
Lall, et al. (2003); Ning and Reed (1995); and Tsai (1994) look at FDI from the 
supply and demand side. Focussing on the demand-side, they identify host country 
pull factors like, interest rates, taxes, size of market, trade policies, fiscal policies, 
exchange rates and human capital development. Institutional factors like 
bureaucracy, corruption, political risk, property rights and transaction costs are also 




(c) Firm-specific determinants of investment 
Tyebjee & Bruno (1984) suggest five broad investment criteria used by VCs to 
determine whether or not to make an investment. These factors are market 
attractiveness, product differentiation, managerial capabilities, environmental threat 
resistance and cash-out potential. Market attractiveness considers the size of the 
existing market of the target company as well as its growth prospects and ease of 
access. VCs also consider whether there is an existing market need. Product 
differentiation is dependent on the ability of the business owner to produce a unique 
and profitable product that adequately staves off competition. Managerial 
capabilities are a reflection of the business owners/managers; ability to successfully 
manage the enterprise. Environmental threat resistance examines how shielded the 
target company’s products and services are against a broad range of environmental 
threats that they are unable to control. These threats are due to competition, 
macroeconomic conditions and technological advances. The final criterion is cash-
out potential which is simply the ease of investment liquidation. 
 
Macmillan, Siegel, & Narasimha (1985) identify five criteria: personality and 
experience, product and market characteristics, financial considerations. 
Personality and experience are in relation to the business owner/management. Fund 
managers consider this to be the most important criteria for investment. The factors 
considered in reviewing one’s personality and experience are: being able to manage 
risk, being able to stay in a position, having a track record of experience in the 
relevant industry/with the business and being of good repute. In the product and 
market characteristics segment, the ability to generate high growth rates and being 
able to protect proprietary information are the most important factors. Financial 
considerations are synonymous with high potential returns. The study confirms 
long-held views in the VC community that the entrepreneur is whom the decision 
to invest rests on. 50% of the criteria identified are related to the entrepreneur’s 
capabilities or skillsets. “There is no question that irrespective of the horse 
(product), horse race (market), or odds (the financial criteria), it is the jockey 
(entrepreneur) who fundamentally determines whether the venture capitalist will 




Fried & Hisrich (1994) split investment criteria into 3 categories; concept, 
management and returns. Concept refers to potential growth of earnings, a business 
idea that works or will work, products that offer significant competitive advantages 
and capital requirements that are within reason. Management is expected to be able 
to lead, especially under pressure. Returns mean that the investments should provide 
a viable exit, a high rate of return and a high absolute return.  
 
(d) Summary of investment determinants from theoretical review 
Having reviewed the theoretical literature, the determinants of investment are 
summarised in the table below: 
Table 2: Investment determinants from theory 
 
Source: Author’s research 
 
3.3 Empirical review of the determinants of investment 
This this section of the chapter reviews the result of empirical studies that specifically 






- sectors of interest
Market attractiveness
- high growth sector

















Monetary and fiscal policies
- taxation
- foreign exchange 
- inflation
Exit
- ease of liquidation
- available market
Investment Determinants based on Theory
49 
 
(a) North America 
Gompers and Lerner (1998) published their seminal piece on the drivers of supply 
and demand of VC in the USA. They used regression analyses across a 22-year 
period. They found that IPOs were the main factor driving VC in the USA 
confirming the generally accepted idea that IPOs and VC were linked. They also 
found that higher GDP growth and increased research and development expenditure 
increased levels of VC financing. Research and development expenditure was 
considered a proxy for innovation. They found that lower capital gains taxes 
increased the supply of VC, only because lower taxes motivated employees to 
become entrepreneurs which drove up the demand for VC. Later, Bruce's (2000) 
examination of the US tax system found that reducing an employee’s average tax 
rate in self-employment increased their probability of transitioning into self-
employment, thereby potentially increasing VC demand. 
 
Kortum and Lerner (2000) examined the relationship between innovation and VC 
in the USA. They used reduced-form regressions to analyse twenty manufacturing 
sub-industries within the US manufacturing sector over a thirty year period and 
found a relationship between VC and patenting activity. This is in keeping with 
Gompers and Lerner’s (1998) findings with respect to research and development 
expenditure as a proxy for innovation. 
 
Hellmann and Puri (2000) surveyed 173 Silicon Valley start-ups and concluded that 
firms that follow an innovator strategy are more likely to contract VC than firms 
that follow an imitator strategy. Their findings are similar to Gompers and Lerner 
(1998) and Kortum and Lerner (2000). 
 
(b) Europe 
Muzyka, Birley, & Leleux (1996) identified different investment criteria and 
administered a trade-off questionnaire to 73 VCs. They concluded that European 
VCs were mostly attracted to solid management teams and sufficient financial and 
product market conditions. They also observed that European VCs collectively 
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would invest in a target with strong management and financial product market 
considerations even if it did not meet the fund and deal requirements. 
 
La Porta et al. (1997) found that legal systems with regards to investor protection 
were important in determining the size of a country’s capital market. In countries 
with robust legal and investor protection structures, suppliers were more likely to 
provide financing to businesses than in countries that lack these structures. They 
examined 49 countries and found that those with weaker legal systems had smaller 
capital markets and vice versa. The French legal system in particular was singled 
out as having a negative effect on the size of capital markets. 
 
Jeng and Wells (2000) built on Gompers and Lerner’s (1998) paper and performed 
an analysis of the determinants of VC funding across 21 countries including the 
USA. 17 of the countries were European, the rest were: USA, Canada, Israel, and 
New Zealand. They used panel data over an 11 year period and performed 
regression analyses to arrive at their results. They found that IPOs were the main 
driver of VC financing and that later stage investments in particular responded more 
strongly to IPOs than early stage investments. Unlike Gompers and Lerner (1998), 
they found GDP growth to be statistically insignificant in driving VC. 
 
A comparison of the Polish and Czech legal systems showed that Poland adopted 
stricter securities regulations than the Czech Republic. Its laws protected investors, 
required significant information disclosures, and made use of a ‘motivated’ 
regulator to enforce them. The results were that the Polish capital market grew at a 
faster rate than the Czech market, external financing was easier to source and 
investor expropriation was kept at a minimum (Glaeser, Johnson, & Shleifer, 2001). 
These findings support the view that stronger legal systems increase the level of 
financing in the market according to La Porta et al. (1997). 
 
Romain & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie's (2003) used panel data regression 
analysis of 16 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries 
over an 8-year period to identify the determinants of VC activity. They found that 
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VC activity was strongly related to GDP growth. This mirrors Gompers and Lerner 
(1998) and Jeng and Wells’s (2000) findings. They also found that increases in 
short-term interest rates increased the demand for VC. Technological opportunities 
identified by patenting, research and development also increased the supply of VC. 
These findings were similar to Kortum and Lerner (2000) and Hellmann and Puri’s 
(2000) conclusions that innovation and VC activity are linked. Increases in 
corporate tax were found to reduce VC activity.  
 
Félix, Pires, and Gulamhussenb (2007) analysed the determinants of VC activity in 
Europe. Their data covered 5 years and 23 European nations. Using panel data 
regression analysis, they found that increased mergers and acquisitions volumes 
lead to increases in VC activity while increases in unemployment lead to decreases 
in VC activity. 
 
Engel and Keilbach (2007) investigated the relationship between innovation and 
VC activity amongst young German start-ups. Using patenting activity they 
analysed German start-ups and found that more innovative firms were more likely 
to engage with VCs and attract VC. Romain & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie 
(2003), Kortum and Lerner (2000) and Hellmann and Puri (2000) all found a link 
between innovation and VC activity. 
 
Bernoth and Colavecchio (2014) used an extreme bound analysis and fixed effects 
panel estimation to determine the macro-economic investment determinants of PE 
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Western Europe. They focussed on testing 
the extent to which the economic environment, financial market, labour market and 
the political, legal and social environment affected a country’s PE investment 
attractiveness. Using data over a 10-year period and reviewing 16 countries, they 
found different results for each region. For CEE countries, they found that GDP per 
capita, GDP growth and private sector bank claims as a proportion of GDP were 
robust and significant determinants of PE investment activity. For Western 
European nations, they observed that inflation levels, unemployment rates, GDP per 
capita and GDP growth all displayed a significant and robust relationship with PE 
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activity. The pro-cyclicality in their results is consistent with Gompers and Lerner 
(1998) and Romain & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie's (2003). 
 
(c) Global 
Djankov, Ganser, McLiesh, Ramalho, and Shleifer (2008) analysed the effect of 
corporate income tax rates on FDI, aggregate investment and entrepreneurial 
activity across 85 countries. They found that increases in higher corporate income 
tax rates negatively impacted aggregative investment, FDI and entrepreneurial 
activity. They found a positive relationship between corporate income tax rates and 
the size of the informal economy. 
 
Groh & Wallmeroth (2016) expanded on the Jeng and Wells’s (2000) research on 
the determinants of VC investing by focussing on emerging market economies. 
Their data set was composed of 118 countries, 78 of which were considered 
emerging market economies. By analysing panel data over a 13 year period they 
found that the drivers of VC investing were different for emerging economies and 
developed economies. They found that the investment volumes of mergers and 
acquisitions and legal rights all have a positive effect on VC but are reduced in 
emerging markets. They also found that bribery, corruption and innovation played 
a particular role in affecting VC activity in emerging markets.  
 
(d) Asia 
D. Cumming, Fleming, Johan, and Takeuchi (2012) examined the relationship 
between legal protection, corruption and PE returns in Asia using univariate and 
multivariate statistical analysis. They focussed on reviewing the LBO sector in 20 
countries over a 21-year period. They found that legal protection is a determinant 
of PE returns in Asia. They found that weak legal protections have a negative effect 
on transaction structures and create uncertainty during exits which depresses 
returns. However, when controlling for legal systems, they found that PE returns 
were higher in countries with corruption. They found that even in environments 
characterised by weak legal protection, PE fund managers are able to change 




Using semi-structured interviews of 12 PE firms and 8 DFIs that invest in Sub-
Saharan Africa, Loos (2010) identified four broad categories of Sub-Saharan 
African investment determinants. These were resources, returns, risk, and business 
climate. Resources were constituted of: availability of skilled entrepreneurs, 
availability of skilled management, availability of investments between $15 million 
and $50 million, and natural resources. In looking at returns, returns on investment, 
GDP growth rates and business scalability were the main factors identified. Risk 
covered political and economic risk. Finally the business climate was representative 
of the legal framework and corruption. The factors generally identified in relation 
to skilled management and business scalability generally mirror  the findings of 
(Fried and Hisrich, (1994); Macmillan et al. (1985) and Tyebjee & Bruno (1984). 
 
Adongo (2011) observed 36 different African countries to identify the determinants 
of VC activity on the continent. Using OLS regression analyses, he found that the 
rule of law, disclosure index, and research and development expenditure were all 
positively related to VC activity on the continent. This would suggest that the 
general legal framework and innovation are the biggest drivers of VC activity in 
Africa. Capital gains taxes were found to reduce the demand for VC from the 
entrepreneur. Like Jeng and Wells (2000), GDP growth rate was not identified as 
determinant of investment. 
 
Babarinde (2012) carried out a non-statistical analysis of the PE environment on the 
African continent. He suggested that a rising middle class, comparatively higher 
return on investment offerings and the participation of large international 
development finance institutions (DFIs) in PE financing all catalysed PE investment 
in Africa. 
 
Mlambo & Jover (2014) administered a survey to 18 PE funds and conducted 10 
expert interviews to determine the factors affecting the attractiveness of Angola to 
PE. They concluded that the factors were country growth, access to viable 
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investments, the target company’s competitive advantage and the availability of 
natural resources. Their findings are similar to Loos (2010). 
 
IESE Business School developed a PE and VC attractiveness index of 125 countries 
across the world. According to their latest ratings, Zambia is ranked 78th and the 
most important determinants of PE investment in Zambia are taxation, economic 
activity and investor protection and corporate governance. The constraints are 
human capital, depth of capital market and entrepreneurial opportunities (Groh et 
al., 2018). The IESE index is the only observable empirical data on the factors that 
influence PE in Zambia. It is limited, however, in that it did not take the actual views 
of PE investors that invest in Zambia into account. The index is a calculation of 
fixed factors applied across the world. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter established the theory behind PE investment levels and identified broad 
macroeconomic and firm-specific determinants of investments. The macroeconomic 
determinants are growth, trade, legal system, human capital and monetary and fiscal 
policies while the firm-specific factors are market attractiveness, product, returns, 
management and exit. In exploring the empirical results there is an identifiable gap in 








This chapter describes the methodology that guides the research process and answers 
the two research questions identified in Chapter 1. The chapter describes the overall 
research strategy, the research design and the method of data collection and analysis 
while providing justifications for the strategies selected in executing the research. The 
limitations of the methods used are also described and discussed.  
 
4.2 Research approach 
 
There are two distinct styles of research, the quantitative or deductive type of research 
and the qualitative or inductive type of research (Xavier University Library, 2012). 
Quantitative research makes use of quantitative measurement and statistical analysis 
tools to investigate a research problem while qualitative research uses non-quantitative 
data collection and analysis tools to describe “reality as experienced by the 
respondents” (Adams, Khan, & Raeside, 2014, p.6). Jonker & Pennink (2010) describe 
the aim of quantitative research as being “to identify the characteristics and structure of 
phenomena and events examined in their natural context” (p.91).  The two styles can 
either be used separately or mixed optimally. 
 
The qualitative method of research is necessary when knowledge of the topic being 
explored is limited, hence its exploratory nature. As such, qualitative analysis has often 
preceded quantitative analysis in social science research (Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2005). 
Given the identified gap in qualitative and quantitative data on this research topic as 
well as the inherent restrictions on access to private financing information, a qualitative 
approach to the research was identified as the best approach to answering the research 
questions. 
 
In drawing up the research strategy, reference is made to Loos (2010) who conducted a 
similar research on PE financing in SSA. Similar methods in structuring the research 
methodology are used in this research. 
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4.3 Research design 
(a) Data collection 
In order to conduct a qualitative research, Jonker & Pennink (2010) advise on an 
open-minded approach to the research. This approach is supported by the findings 
of the literature review which highlighted various different approaches to obtaining 
data on the factors that affect PE investment levels. Working with an open-ended 
question makes the research more flexible.  
 
To answer the research questions about the determinants and constraints to PE 
financing in Zambia, the researcher had to obtain the information directly from the 
Fund Managers and Investment Professionals who undertake these investments. As 
noted by Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008), companies and corporations are the 
sources for research questions and empirical data in studies business phenomena 
like this research. As such, interviews were the preferred method of data collection. 
 
The research was predicated on exploration, the researcher was not an expert and 
was hoping to find information on the topic. The researcher was conducting the 
research in the context of a specific topic, the main source of the specific topic was 
primary data, and the researcher was attempting to see things from the interviewee’s 
perspective (Jonker & Pennink, 2010).  
 
According to Adams, Khan, & Raeside (2014) there are different interview styles, 
namely, exploratory, design, in-depth, and longitudinal interviews. Exploratory and 
design interviews were considered inappropriate for the kind of data being sought 
because their results lacked the depth required. Longitudinal interviews are 
concerned with interviewing and re-interviewing the research participants over a 
long period of time. Given the time frame and availability of the interviewees, this 
too was considered an inappropriate interview style. In-depth interviews are more 
appropriate for qualitative research as they tend to yield valuable information. In-
depth interviews are normally unstructured and tend to last for about an hour. The 
researcher prepares an interview road map and asks questions as the interview 
develops based on the responses of the participant.  
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Because data is being compared against different respondents, an in-depth semi-
structured interview approach is best as it allows for flexibility and general 
comparability (Guthrie, 2010). Semi-structured interviews were selected as the 
method of obtaining the information required from the Fund Managers. According 
to Bradford and Cullen, (2012), semi-structured interviews are one of the most 
popular qualitative data collection techniques because they allow the researcher to 
explore the interviewee’s view points and obtain first-hand, detailed accounts from 
their experiences. Given the exploratory nature of the research, it was important for 
the researcher to obtain first-hand information from the interviewees. 
 
The researcher used a combination of face to face and telephonic interviews to 
obtain the data. All interviewees present in Zambia were interviewed in person and 
all interviewees based outside Zambia were interviewed telephonically. In person 
interviews were all conducted at the interviewees’ offices. The interviews lasted 
anywhere between 29 minutes and 1 hour, with the majority of the interviews lasting 
one hour. 
 
After conducting the first two interviews, the researcher adapted their interview 
questions and added more structure to the interviews to ensure that the research 
questions were being addressed by the interviewees. The researcher then applied a 
standard set of 10 questions to the remaining population based on their experience 
with the first two interviewees. 
 
All interviews were recorded with the interviewee’s permission and later 
transcribed using transcribing software to prepare the data for further analysis. 
 
(b) Population and sampling 
According to Asoko Insight (2018) there were 7 VC and PE firms with offices in 
Zambia. Due to the lack of availability of a centralised database of VC and PE firms 
in Zambia, it was difficult to use any sort of secondary database as a basis of firm 
selection. As such, the sample was drawn up using industry knowledge from 
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interactions with local fund managers and investment advisors familiar with the 
Zambian industry. 
 
From the above interactions and an exploration of the internet, the researcher drew 
a sample of 16 firms with experience investing in Zambia to approach with 
preliminary interview requests. The firms were domiciled both locally and 
internationally. In selecting the sample, the researcher sought to obtain a variety of 
opinions from early stage investors (VC), late stage investors (PE)  and 
development finance institutions (FoF and/or PE). The researcher also sought to 
obtain information from individuals that were experienced with making PE 
investments in Zambia and Africa. In drawing this sample, the researcher noted that 
Loos (2010) was able to identify determinants of PE financing in SSA with a sample 
of 12 PE firms. The researcher was assured then that a sample of 16 firms was more 
than sufficient for a single country, especially one with a nascent PE industry. 
 
Of the 16 firms, 12 individuals representing 11 local and international firms and 
institutions agreed to participate in the research. Noting that the researcher did not 
use a verifiable secondary database to obtain the sample, the two tables on the pages 
that follow provide an insight into the composition of the final sample to enhance 
the credibility of the research and the sampling technique. To protect the 
interviewees’ confidentiality, the fund sizes and average ticket sizes represented in 
Table 4 cannot be directly correlated with the numerical arrangement of the persons 






Table 3: Sample selection - position and firm-specialism 
 
Source: Author’s research 
 
Table 4: Sample selection – average ticket size and fund size 
 
Source: Author’s research 
 
(c) Data analysis 
It is important to establish the common links between the different interview 
responses to appropriately synthesise and make inferences from the data. Adams et 
al. (2014) present four methods for analysing qualitative data: content analysis, 
summarising, the “Framework Approach” and the grounded theory approach. The 




3 Manager FoF and PE
4 Manager VC
5 Director FoF and PE
6 Director FoF and PE
7 Partner PE
8 Partner PE















11 $1m Not disclosed
12 $1m Not disclosed
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be difficult to standardise. For this type of data, a grounded theory approach is often 
recommended.  
 
According to Jonker & Pennink (2010) the grounded theory methodology’s core 
aim is defined as “the development of a theory that is ‘grounded’ in practice” (p.84). 
The essence of this approach is to develop theories from the data during collection. 
The data is reviewed to identify different categories and characteristics relevant to 
the identified categories. The different categories are then continually compared 
against the other to identify any relationships that exist. Critics of grounded theory 
argue that it requires great research skills (Allan, 2013) and that novice researchers 
are highly prone to making methodological errors (El Hussein, Hirst, Salyers, & 
Osuji, 2014). As was concluded by Loos (2010), using this method strictly to 
analyse data was not suitable for the researcher considering their novel research 
skills. 
 
In keeping with Loos’s (2010) approach to identifying the determinants of PE 
financing in SSA, analysis of the interview data was modelled on the works of 
Green et al.'s (2007) refined approach to the grounded theory below: 
Figure 15: Data analysis 
 





In this first step, the researcher made notes and transcribed the recorded interview data 
into text using software to familiarise themselves with the interviewees responses. 
 
Coding 
Coding is defined as “the process of examining and organising the information 
contained in each interview and the whole dataset. It forces the researcher to begin to 
make judgements and tag blocks of transcripts” (Green et al., 2007, p.548). In this step 
the researcher reviewed the interview transcripts and highlighted responses in two 
different colours. One colour was for answers to the determinants of investment and the 
second colour was used to highlight answers to the constraints to investment. The 
researcher then attached one to three-word codes to these responses. 
 
Categorisation 
The researcher then analysed the codes using a spreadsheet and highlights for similar 
codes, highlighting them according to their relationship with one another to make more 
sense out of the data. The researcher noted the codes that appeared frequently on the 
transcripts as those pointed strongly towards central ideas. 
 
Themes 
Finally, the researcher attached identified themes in the data in relation to the research 
questions. This process involved “interpreting the categories based on theoretical 
concepts to arrive at generalisable conclusions from the results obtained” (Loos, 2010, 
p.47).  
 







4.4 Research limitations 
Quantitative PE data in Zambia was difficult to source. This limited the study from 
using a mix of both qualitative and quantitative data to answer the research questions. 
A quantitative analysis would have strengthened the results of the qualitative data 
analysis. 
 
Data about PE in general in Zambia was also limited. In selecting the samples, PE firms 
that have invested in Zambian ventures may have been erroneously excluded due to 
lack of data. Data about other players in the SSA market, especially, the global funds 
was difficult to source from PE and VC associations because they keep that information 
for paying members. 
 
The sampling method was largely based on the researcher familiarising themselves with 
the industry and conducting online research to determine which firms fell within the 
subject-matter. Sampling from a single observable database would have eliminated any 
bias in the research. 
 
Finally, information about PE financing in Zambia is non-existent. Researchers would 
have to rely on the PE industry to disseminate information about it. Because this 
information is not independently verifiable, it may be unreliable. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The chapter has provided an overview of the research methodology selected. A 
qualitative approach using semi-structured interviews of a sample of local and 
international Fund Managers is the chosen data collection technique. A four-step data 
analysis approach is the tool used to disseminate the interview responses. The chapter 
ends by identifying research limitations associated with the methodology selected.  
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5.0 Research findings, analysis and discussion 
5.1 Introduction 
This Chapter provides the findings to research questions first posed in Chapter 1: 
Research Question1 (RQ1): What drives private equity financing in Zambia? 
Research Question 2 (RQ1): What prevents private equity investments in Zambia? 
The Chapter discusses the results of the findings, referencing back to literature where 
necessary. 
 
5.2 Research findings 
Based on the methodology employed in Chapter 4 and the results of the data analysis 
which have been filed in the Appendix, the two broad drivers of PE financing in Zambia 
are the attractiveness of the business and the business environment. Underpinning each 
of these broad drivers are sub-drivers or constraints to investment. This is represented 
in Figure 16 below: 
 
Figure 16: Determinants of venture capital and private equity financing 
  
Text in pink represents constraints.  
Source: Author’s research  
BUSINESS ATTRACTIVENESS BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
-Management skills and capacity -Political stability
-Business track record -GDP growth
-Exits and returns -Population growth
-Impact -PE/VC Culture





5.3 Research analysis and discussion- Business attractiveness 
In keeping with the literature, the overall attractiveness of the business is a 
consideration that fund managers take into account when making their investment 
decisions.  The major drivers of investment identified in assessing a business were; the 
management team, the scalability (growth) of the business, the opportunities for 
regional trade, the track record of the business, the opportunity to make an impact and 
the visibility of an exit. The interviewees identified insufficient business opportunities 
as an investment constraint. 
 
(a) Management skills and capacity 
92% of the interviewees identified the management team as key factor that they 
took into account in making their investments. There was an underlying theme that 
the potential investee company was only as good as its management team and their 
related skills and experience. One interviewee remarked “100% of the investment 
is in the team”. This finding is in keeping with the theory in the literature review 
that identified the management team as the most important factor to investors 
(Macmillan et al., 1985).    
 
In evaluating the management team, the respondents were looking for skilled 
middle managers with strong management capabilities and a track record of being 
able to perform in their roles. The Fund Managers saw themselves as partners with 
the team in delivering results. References to “partnership” came out a number of 
times in the responses from the interviewees indicating that it was important for the 
Fund Managers and the management team to work together towards a common goal 
for the organisation. Further, for the Fund Managers, whose objective it is to 
maximise returns, having a competent team in place contributes to the company’s 
performance and future financial returns. 
 
For the early stage investors, there was the added layer of the integrity of the 
business owner. Because PE is not publicly traded or highly regulated, PE firms 
take a significant risk when they choose to make a private investment in a firm, 
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especially in Zambia where one could argue that information asymmetry is 
prevalent in smaller firms and even medium-sized firms. Added to this, the Zambian 
PE sector has already been described as small so even information within the sector 
may be limited to some degree. 
 
For some of the interviewees, character and integrity becomes even more important 
when they cannot place sufficient reliance on the country’s legal system. While 
opinions on Zambia’s legal system were generally positive, there were a few 
interviewees that considered the system ineffective and so to effectively hedge 
themselves against losses due to legal system failures, they chose to pay more 
attention to the business owner as part of their due diligence procedures. Fafchamps, 
Pender, & Robinson (1995) and Bottazzi, Rin, & Hellmann (2009) found that 
weaker legal environments that failed to adequately address contract breaches gave 
entrepreneurs a moral hazard and a reduced need to actively commit themselves to 
the investment.  
 
For smaller firms and even medium-sized firms that are owner-managed, a lot of 
the firms’ success and potential is predicated on the owner. As much as PE firms 
may consider the robustness of the company’s financial statements, the proof of 
concept and the long-term prospects for the product/service, all these factors are 
only as good as the character of the person who is actually behind the business. In 
changing, dynamic environments, in particular, investors want to be assured that 
they are in partnership with an honest and dependable individual who is committed 
to the long-term objectives of the company. To this, some GPs also added that they 
considered how much of a stake that the owner had contributed to the company in 




(b) Domestic and regional scalability 
Scalability was a concept that was brought out by all the respondents. All the 
respondents were looking to grow the business in some way or form with 75% of 
the respondents indicating that they specifically took cross border trading potential 
into account in evaluating the future growth prospects of the target investee’s 
business. 
 
It is only natural for PE investors to be attracted to markets and sectors that are 
growing. Part of the premise of PE and VC investing described earlier in this study, 
is that it is focussed on companies that have high growth potential. These companies 
should have the ability to scale their operations to deliver on the growth targets of 
the investors in order to enable a successful exit. 
 
Scalability and the size of the population were linked. Most of the interviewees 
alluded to additional growth factors including population growth, increases in 
disposable income, rising middle class levels and urbanisation as considerations 
that they made in determining the scalability of a business. A growing population 
coupled with an increasing middle class represents a future market that is able to 
consume the products and services on offer from target companies. It was observed 
that interviewees leaned towards food, agriculture and agro processing as their 
preferred sectors of investment. All these sectors share a common thread of being 
dependant on a sufficient level of consumer demand which makes population 
growth an important contributor towards their long-term success. 
 
As shown by Figure 17  on the next page, Zambia’s population is expected to double 
over a 25 year period between 2011 and 2035 at an annual rate of around 2.8% 
growing to around 26 million people of whom young people from the ages of 0 to 
35 represent more than 51% of the population (Central Statistical Office, 2017). 
This is a positive signal for PE investors interested in companies that produce goods 
and/or services that there is likely to be a growing market for their consumption 
over time.  
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Figure 17: Zambia projected population (2011–2035) 
 
Adapted from Central Statistical Office (2013, p.10) 
 
75% of the Fund Managers were interested in regional consumption of Zambian-
produced goods. Most of interviewees did remark that although Zambia’s 
population growth forecasts are impressive, the country’s population is comparably 
smaller than other countries which sometimes cast a shadow on the scalability of a 
project. They therefore considered the export potential of the products on offer in a 
target company in making their investment decisions.  
 
Zambia’s central location within the Southern African region with 8 bordering 
countries, gives it an attractive export market advantage. Countries like the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), for example, rely heavily on imports to 
supplement low domestic production levels, presenting Zambian goods with a 
readily available market for consumption. DRC’s population of over 81 million 
people provides Zambia with a significantly larger market for export exploration  
(World Bank Group, 2017). 
 
According to Zambia’s Central Bank’s Direction of Trade Reports, 6.0% of 
Zambia’s exports equivalent to around $488 million ($500 million in today’s 
dollars) in 2017, were to the DRC. In the African region, the DRC was Zambia’s 
biggest export destination followed by South Africa which took up 5.6% of exports 
equivalent to $453 million ($464 million in today’s dollars) (Bank of Zambia, 
2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d).   
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(c) Impact potential 
Half of the Fund Managers were looking for opportunities to make an impact 
through their investments. All the Fund Managers seeking a development impact 
were clear that the desire to make an impact and earn a return for their funds were 
of equal importance and they could not have one without the other. This was 
clarified to dispel the notion that impact-seeking investors were perhaps not as 
concerned about returns as generalist investors. 
 
The Fund Managers were commonly led by environmental, social and governance 
guidelines that their firms adhered to. This was common amongst the DFIs and the 
Fund Managers that were recipients of DFI funds. Most of the impact-seeking Fund 
Managers were particularly drawn to businesses with the potential to employ large 
numbers of people and in doing so, transform the social and economic trajectories 
of workers. This partly explained why agriculture, food and agri-business were 
identified by 75% of the Fund Managers as one of the most attractive investment 
sectors in Zambia. Apart from the natural resources and skills that Zambia has in 
this sector, it is also a large scale employer in the rural areas where farms are 
located.  
 
These findings marry those of the Global Impact Investing Network who note that 
opportunities continue to exist for DFIs and PE firms to make their mark in Zambia 
through impact investments. Investors with a long-term horizon that are able to fund 
several capital rounds of increasing amounts have an opportunity to capture long-
term growth in the Zambian market. The bulk of Zambia’s impact investments come 
from DFIs and Zambia is the second largest DFI impact investment destination in 
Southern Africa based on the most current available data as at 2015, having received 
close to $2 billion in investments across 105 deals. Behind, South Africa and 
Angola, Zambia is the third largest recipient of non-DFI impact investments in the 
Southern African region, estimated at $157 million ($166 million in today’s dollars) 
across 58 deals as at 2015 (Global Impact Investing Network, 2016) 
 
(d) Exit and returns 
Exit opportunities are closely linked with growth prospects. It follows that a 
growing sector/company with long-term future potential will attract suitable buyers 
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when the time of exit arises. Almost all the interviewees preferred method of exiting 
a business in Zambia is through trade sales and secondary sales to other financial 
investors or in some cases buyouts to the management team. Because the stock 
market is viewed as illiquid it did not come across as an attractive exit option.  
 
Either directly or indirectly, the interviewees identified returns as a driver of 
investment. Desired returns varied between US Dollar internal rates of return of 
10% to 25% with some investors pointing out that Zambia was very attractive 
because it offered comparatively higher returns that similar countries. 
 
The essence of PE financing is not to hold on to an investment but to grow and sell 
the investee company so as to earn a return on investment. As such, exit visibility 
was a theme that came out of the interviews. It is tied in with market growth in that 
PE financiers believe that a growing sector will also be attractive to potential buyers 
in the long-term. Growing investor interest and increases in activity in a particular 
sector are often a signal to PE financiers of a potentially viable investment sector. 
Due to the illiquid nature of the LuSE, most of the interviewers prefer to exit 
through trade sales. 
 
In some way or the other, 58% of the interviewees pointed to attractiveness of 
returns as a driver of investments. Ultimately, this is the goal of investing. It was 
observed that impact investors placed impact at par with returns while generalist 
investors pointed out that the potential to make good returns in Zambia was quite 
high based on their experience. 
 
(e) Business track record 
50% of the respondents identified the track record of the business as being a 
determinant of investment. In reviewing this, the Fund Managers were looking for 
enterprises with a history of doing business even if the businesses were young or 
unprofitable. They wanted to observe the proof of concept actualised, to confirm 
that the business actually does work. Even if a business was unprofitable, the Fund 
Managers wanted to observe that the business had a growing revenue figure and 
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customers and suppliers that they could point to. Financial statements and record-
keeping become important here, as it’s the only way of quantifying the businesses’ 
performance.  
 
(f) Limited opportunities 
50% of the Fund Managers identified limited opportunities for investment a 
constraint to making investments in Zambia. At least 25% mentioned that they were 
actively looking for opportunities to make investments but were failing to find the 
right kind of business to invest in. 
 
This could be because Zambia is a young nation from an entrepreneurial 
perspective. Due to the country’s socialist economic history highlighted in Chapter 
2, up until the mid-1990s Zambians were not conditioned to be entrepreneurs. In a 
capitalistic society, plant and equipment which are considered to be the elements of 
production are owned and operated privately (Baumol, Litan, & Schramm, 2009). 
The opposite is largely the case in a socialist society. So essentially, with the 
liberalisation of the economy in the early 1990s, Zambians have had to familiarise 
themselves with the workings of capitalism. This understandably affects the quality 
of business ventures and of entrepreneurs especially given all the economic 
challenges faced by the country when it began to liberalise.  
 
“Entrepreneurial capitalism” refers to economies where the market is ruled by 
competitive forces, new companies are created often and small businesses make 
large contributions towards production. A hallmark of this form of capitalism is 
innovation and the USA is a prime example of such an economy. Entrepreneurs are 
incentivised and relentlessly driven to innovate. These innovations tend to change 
history, create entirely new industries and offshoots and ultimately drive economic 
growth. Innovation may thrive in free markets where risk takers are well rewarded 




Innovation drives VC financing. Gompers & Lerner (1998), Kortum & Lerner 
(2000),  Hellmann & Puri (2000), Engel & Keilbach (2007) and  Groh & 
Wallmeroth (2016) all find that innovation increases VC activity. Innovation and   
 
Zambia’s score on the 2018 Global Innovation Index (GII) is a source of concern. 
Out of 126 countries, Zambia ranked 120th and out of 23 countries within the SSA 
region it placed 18th. The 2018 GII report noted that countries with rich, diverse 
economies and export portfolios were likely so score higher on the index (Cornell 
University, INSEAD, & WIPO, 2018). 
 
5.4 Research analysis and discussion- Business environment 
The drivers of PE and VC investment in Zambia under the business environment were 
GDP growth rates, population growth and political stability. The constraints identified 
were PE and VC culture and currency risk. Population growth was explored when 
analysing the business scalability under section 5.3(b) of this Chapter so it will not be 
covered further here. 
 
(a) Currency risk 
50% of the fund managers identified currency risk as a part of the business 
environment that posed a risk to their investing activity. This is because the Fund 
Managers invest US dollars into Zambian entities that operate using Zambian 
kwacha. When the local currency depreciates against the US dollar, the investment 
is eroded and may potentially reduce the PE firm’s return on investment at exit.  
 
Zambia has experienced exchange rate volatility since 2015 as show by Figure 18, 
which justifies the concerns of Fund Managers. Loos’s (2010) findings were also 
that Fund Managers investing in SSA were concerned about the erosion of their 





Figure 18: Zambian kwacha volatility (2015–2019) 
 
Source: Bank of Zambia (2019a) 
 
(b) GDP growth rate 
GDP growth was mentioned by at least 50% of the Fund Managers as a positive 
determinant of investment when assessing the business environment of the country. 
The Fund Managers were interested in the long-term macroeconomic fundamentals 
of the country in making their investment decisions and took GDP growth as an 
indicator of better opportunities for investment. 
 
Figure 19 shows that Zambia’s compounded annual growth rate of GDP at PPP 
between 2006 and 2017 has averaged around 7%. The graph excludes South Africa 
and Angola because the large size of their economies distorts the graph.   
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Figure 19: Southern Africa GDP at PPP (2006-2017) 
 
Source: World Bank Group (2017) 
 
Groh et al. (2018) observe that GDP growth rates are commonly associated with 
having a more prosperous society in which entrepreneurship is likely to increase. 
This is because the capital accumulation associated with higher GDP growth rates 
and development is able to finance the entrepreneur’s risky investments.  
 
This echoes the findings of Gompers & Lerner (1998) who found that economies 
that grew quickly were likely to increase the number of firms and therefore increase 
the number of firms that required access to PE financing. Van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie & Romain (2004) also linked VC activity to GDP growth, showing that the 
activity was closely linked with the pattern of GDP growth.  
 
(c) The culture of PE and VC in Zambia 
As has been brought out at various points in this research, the Zambian PE sector is 
still very small. 50% of the Fund Managers identified this as a constraint for three 
reasons. Firstly, because PE is still relatively novel, there is a general lack of 
understanding and appreciation of its workings amongst SMEs. Secondly, as a 
result of this lack of understanding, most family-run businesses are less likely to be 
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willing to have an equity investor partner with them. Thirdly, because of the small 
size of the sector, it’s difficult for PE investors who are looking for co-investors to 
partner with to make deals where they can share risk. The Fund Managers did note 
that the culture slowly was changing but the sector was still small. 
 
(d) Political stability  
Half the fund managers mentioned Zambia’s long standing reputation for peace and 
stability within the region as a positive determinant of investment. Instability breeds 
uncertainty and most of the fund managers indicated that businesses do not like 
uncertainty. These findings are similar to Le's (2004) findings on the effects of 









5.5 Research recommendations 
One of the underlying objectives of this research was to create awareness amongst 
SMEs in particular about the opportunities that exist for business financing outside of 
bank lending. The research also sought to make recommendations on policy changes 
that could influence the growth of the usage of PE financing in Zambia. 
 
(a) Recommendations for SMEs 
The feedback from the Fund Managers on their outlook on Zambia was very 
positive. All but one were very optimistic about the country’s long-term prospects 
and were keen to make an impact on Zambia, several were actively looking for 
investment opportunities and saw the SME sector as one ripe with potential. 
 
For SMEs it is important to realise that VC can scale their businesses and take them 
beyond their current limits. Microsoft, Facebook and Alibaba are just a few of the 
companies that have used VC in the past to accelerate growth. VCs seek to work in 
partnership with entrepreneurs to grow their businesses. It is a team effort and they 
care about partnership. In order to build the business, the VC is likely to invest in 
training and transferring skills to the SME business owner and their team. VCs are 
highly skilled business managers and strategists, this exposure is invaluable to an 
SME.  
 
To make an SME attractive for investment, it is essential for the owner and 
management team to present themselves as being worthy investment partners. 
Despite the great interest that the Fund Managers have shown in Zambia, they have 
mentioned that limited opportunities constrain them. Noting that they place great 
emphasis on management teams and business owners, it is recommended that SMEs 
take proactively seek opportunities to upskill themselves through SME accelerator 
programmes and business mentorship.  
 
A testament to the growing demand for impact investments in Zambia is the creation 
of Impact Capital Africa in 2018. This is a platform that seeks to bridge the demand 
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and supply gap between impact investors and Zambian companies. Most of the 
companies that make up this forum are successful ventures seeking to raise between 
$250 thousand and $5 million in equity, debt or blended finance (PEP Zambia, 
2018). SMEs are urged to take advantage of such platforms.  
 
Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) are instrumental in funding some of the 
PE regional funds that invest in Zambia. DFIs care about making an impact while 
making a profit. It was very encouraging to note that half of the Fund Managers 
surveyed in this study considered making an impact an important part of their 
decision to invest. This means that aside from purely financial gains, the SME has 
the added benefit of working with an investor that cares about development impact 
too, making the venture more sustainable in the long term. 
 
From the research, regional integration and cross border training potential was 
identified by 75% of the Fund Managers as determinant of investment. This was 
one of the most insightful revelations of this research. In developing their products 
and services, SMEs should consider the possibility of one day extending their 
products and services beyond Zambian borders. 
 
 
(b) Policy recommendations 
The only policy recommendation that this research finds is with regards to pension 
fund investing in Zambia.  
 
Zambian pension fund regulations appear to restrict local investment in PE funds. 
Out of $2 billion in assets under management as at June 2013, Zambian pension 
funds had invested $39 million ($42 million in today’s dollars) in PE funds. For a 
pension fund to invest in PE, it needs the approval of the registrar – discretionary 




It has been observed that all the participants in the Zambian PE sector have to source 
funds from outside of Zambia to invest in the country. To mitigate against some of 
the impacts of currency risk highlighted in this survey, a greater injection of local 
currency into PE funds from Zambian pension funds would be welcome.  
 
Local pension fund participation would also be encouraging to international 
financiers and a positive signal about the SME business prospects in Zambia. In 
addition to this, it offers the pension funds an opportunity to diversify their portfolio 
while contributing to local business development and earning a return on 
investment for the fund. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
This Chapter has provided detailed analyses in response to the research questions about 
what drives and deters PE financing in Zambia. The main drivers of PE financing in 
Zambia have been identified as management skills and capacity, business track record, 
exits and returns, impact, domestic and international scalability, political stability, GDP 
growth and population growth. The main constraints are limited business opportunities, 
the nascent culture of PE and VC in Zambia and volatile foreign exchange rates. SMEs 
are encouraged to take upskill themselves and take full advantage of the benefits that 
PE has to offer while policy makers are encouraged to reconsider pension fund 




The objective of the study was to determine what drives PE financing in Zambia and what 
deters it. The paper was centred on two simple research questions and the results of these 
questions are summarised below: 
 
PE investment in Zambia is determined and catalysed by business attractiveness and the 
business environment. Management skills and capacity, the business track record, exits and 
returns, impact potential, local and international business scalability, political stability, 
GDP growth and population growth rates are all positive drivers of PE investing in Zambia. 
The sector is however, constrained by a less developed PE culture, limited opportunities to 
invest and currency risk. 
 
The study makes the following broad recommendations: 
 SMEs should consider the export-potential of their products. Financiers are 
interested in scaling businesses to other regions. 
 SMEs should take advantage of business mentorship and accelerator programmes. 
They should also participate in the local finance forums that connect impact 
investors to Zambian SMEs. 
 To improve local PE fundraising prospects and mitigate against currency risk, the 
Pensions and Insurance Authority is encouraged to revisit their PE investment 
thresholds.  
 
PE in Zambia still remains largely unexplored academically. The sector could be described 
as boutique/niche/specialised. However, it’s potential to transform businesses through the 
unique value addition that it provides is tremendous. It is hoped that this paper has shone a 
small light into what is a small but growing alternative sector for financing businesses in 
Zambia.  
 
Future researchers may consider exploring the actual structure of financing deals and case 
studies or general studies on the impact of impact investments. As the industry grows and 
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data becomes easily available, researchers may consider performing a quantitative analysis 
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